The Privileges or Immunities Clause Abridged: A Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment by Barnett, Randy E & Bernick, Evan
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2019 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause Abridged: A Critique of Kurt 
Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment 
Randy E. Barnett 
Georgetown University Law Center, rb325@law.georgetown.edu 
Evan Bernick 
Georgetown University Law Center, eb860@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 




Forthcoming in Notre Dame Law Review. 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons 
  
THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE, ABRIDGED: A CRITIQUE OF KURT LASH 
ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 
RANDY E. BARNETT* & EVAN D. BERNICK** 
 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: “No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States.”1 Upon confronting this language, the first question 
most ask is what exactly are the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States”?  It was this very question that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put to attorney 
Alan Gura during oral argument in the case of McDonald v. Chicago,2 as he was 
urging the Court to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect the right 
to keep and bear arms. “But I really would like you to answer the question that you 
didn’t have an opportunity to finish answering, and that is: What other . . . rights? 
What does the privileges and immunities of United States citizenship embrace?”3 
On May 23, 1868, Jacob Howard, Senator from Michigan, former Attorney 
General of Michigan, and the designated sponsor of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
the Senate, delivered a comprehensive and widely-reported address in which he 
addressed this question. According to Howard, the “privileges or immunities” of 
U.S. citizens consisted of two categories of “fundamental guarantees.”4  
In the first category were “the privileges and immunities spoken of in the sec-
ond section of the fourth article of the Constitution.”5 Howard then read a very 
lengthy passage from Justice Washington’s opinion in the 1823 case of Corfield v. 
Coryell6, in which Washington defined the “privileges and immunities” protected 
by Article IV, Section 2, as rights “which are, in their nature, fundamental; which 
belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, 
been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from 
the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.”7  
Washington went on to explain that privileges and immunities “may . . . be all 
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the Government, 
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to 
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.  
2
 561 US 742 (2010). 
3
 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8 (March 2, 2010).  
4
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).  
5
 Id. at 2765.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause appears at U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
6
 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.Pa. 1823).  
7 Id. at 551.  
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whole.”8 He then listed several “fundamental” rights that fell under these “general 
heads”, some of which rights are “unenumerated”, in the sense that they do not 
appear in the federal Constitution in itemized form—such as the rights to travel and 
to be free from discriminatory taxation.9 
After reading from Washington’s Corfield opinion, Howard proceeded to iden-
tify a second category of fundamental rights: “To these privileges and immunities, 
whatever they may be—for they are not and cannot be fully defined in their extent 
and precise nature—to these should be added the personal rights guarantied and 
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution.”10  
Then, after providing a list11 of enumerated personal rights, Howard summa-
rized his understanding of the two categories of “privileges or immunities”: “Now, 
sir, here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by 
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I have recited, 
some by the first eight amendments of the Constitution.”12   
Howard explained that an amendment was necessary to protect these privileges 
and immunities because, at present, “[t]hey d[id] not operate in the slightest degree 
as a restraint or prohibition on state legislation.” So, “[t]he great object of the first 
section of this amendment is . . .  to restrain the power of the States and compel 
them at all times to respect these fundamental guaranties.”13 
It would seem clear that Howard understood the “privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States” to include both (1) the set of unenumerated rights that 
Corfield v. Coryell associated with the “privileges and immunities” of Article IV, 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 547. Washington was here reiterating the canonical formulation of natural rights that was 
originally drafted in 1776 by George Mason for the Virginia Declaration of Rights: 
THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent natural 
rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among 
which are, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing 
property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety. 
See Committee Approved Draft of Virginia Declaration of Rights (May 27, 1776), http://www.gun-
stonhall.org/georgemason/human_rights/vdr_committee_draft.html. Mason’s formulation was 
adopted by several states for the declarations of rights in their own constitutions. See RANDY E. 
BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE 
THE PEOPLE 33-40, 67 (2016). In Washington’s words, these rights were “deemed to be fundamen-
tal.” Corfield, 6 F. Cas., at 551. 
9 Corfield, 6 F. Cas., at 551.  
10
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
11 Id. (emphases added). The list appears to be a partial one, as Howard prefaces it with the phrase 
“such as.” Id. Howard omitted the rights of criminal defendants to confront witnesses, to have com-
pulsory processes for obtaining witnesses in their favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for 
their defense. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend 5. Howard’s list also did not refer to what we call the 
Establishment Clause as any kind of right. Lash has claimed that, though originally a federalism 
provision, by 1868, the Establishment Clause was thought to protect an individual right, but How-
ard’s omission undermines this claim. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment 
Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1154 (1995) (conclud-
ing that “[b]y 1868, the (Non)Establishment Clause was understood to be a liberty as fully capable 
of incorporation as any other provision in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.”).  
12
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (emphases added).   
13
 Id. at 2766. 
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Section 2; and (2) the personal rights enumerated in the first eight amendments to 
the Constitution, and that none of the “fundamental guaranties” in this “mass” may 
be abridged by states. This is the conventional way in which scholars have read 
Howard’s language.14 
Howard’s role as spokesman for the Joint Committee was a product of happen-
stance. William Pitt Fessenden, the chairman of the Committee, had been ill, and 
Howard spoke in his place. Indeed, Howard had voted against the language that he 
was charged with explaining—he preferred language of an earlier draft that was 
more expansive in certain respects and more narrow in others.15  
Howard is difficult to pin down ideologically. Conventionally characterized as 
a “radical” because of his early and energetic support for Black suffrage and his 
hard line stance on the re-admission of former Confederate states into the Union, 
he nonetheless “had a deep respect for the structure of federalism and was generally 
a stickler for constitutional regularity.”16  
If Howard was a reluctant witness, however, there is no reason to doubt that he 
was a reliable one. His interpretation of the Committee’s handiwork was not con-
tested by any Senator. Indeed, so associated did the Fourteenth Amendment become 
with Howard’s interpretation of it in public discourse, it was often referred to 
simply as the “Howard Amendment.”17 
It would, therefore, take a very bold advocate to claim that the original meaning 
of the “privileges or immunities” of U.S. citizens did not “restrain the power of the 
States” to abridge the unenumerated18 rights of citizens that were listed by Wash-
ington and Howard or “compel [states] at all times to respect these guaranties.” 
                                                 
14
 See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1969 108-9 
(1990); Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause to 
Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the Federal Government, 3 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 1, 21 (1998); Richard Aynes, Ink Blot or Not? The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 
11 PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1312, (2008); Christopher R. Green, Incorporation, Total Incorporation, 
and Nothing But Incorporation?, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 93, 108-9 (2015).  
15 That earlier draft, composed by former Congressman Robert Dale Owen, prohibited “discrimi-
nation . . . as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” 
BENJAMIN K. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 296 
(1914). This language was more narrow in that it prohibited only discrimination, not generally-
applicable deprivations of civil rights, and thus would not protect white supporters of the Union 
against Southern retaliation. It was broader in that the term “civil rights” may have been fuzzier at 
the edges than “privileges or immunities.” Concerns that the phrase “civil rights” might be used to 
secure voting rights, the right to sit on juries, schooling rights, and the right to hold political office 
led the phrase’s redaction from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See MALTZ, supra note, at 67-9.   
16
Earl M. Maltz, Radical Politics and Constitutional Theory: Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michi-
gan and the Problem of Reconstruction, 32 MICH. HIST. REV. 19, 24-6 (2006).  
17 See HORACE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 90 (1908).   
18 In one sense, Lash is indeed claiming that constitutionally unenumerated rights are also protected 
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Lash clearly believes that the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause confers a privilege against parochial discrimination with respect to certain, textually-unspec-
ified fundamental rights that are among the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the several 
states,” and that the Privileges or Immunities Clause empowers the federal courts and Congress to 
prevent such discrimination. Are those “rights” “enumerated” because “privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the several states” is part of the constitutional text and they are among those privileges 
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Were this claim accurate, it would follow either that Jacob Howard misunderstood 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or that scholars have long misunderstood what 
Jacob Howard said about the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  
Professor Kurt Lash is so bold. In a series of painstakingly-researched articles19 
that have culminated in a book,20 Lash has proposed that the original public mean-
ing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects enumerated personal rights—
and only enumerated personal  rights.21 According to Lash, the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was, in antebellum jurisprudence, under-
stood to be a mere “Comity Clause” that confers only a singular enumerated right 
of sojourning citizens of a given state to be free from discrimination with respect 
to their fundamental civil rights when traveling in another state.22 And it was this 
singular right to which Howard was referring. 
According to Lash, therefore, Howard’s two categories of “privileges or im-
munities”—unenumerated and enumerated—receive two different levels of protec-
tion against state abridgment. The enumerated rights listed in the first eight amend-
ments (and elsewhere) are protected absolutely.23 States are free, however, to 
abridge the unenumerated privileges and immunities identified by Justice Wash-
ington in Corfield, provided they do not discriminate against out-of-staters when 
either extending or regulating the exercise of those privileges and immunities.  
                                                 
and immunities, or unenumerated because they are not specifically listed? Or are they unenumerated 
because they are only protected against parochial discrimination? Really, on Lash’s account, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause enumerates a privilege to be free from parochial discrimination 
with respect to unenumerated rights.  
With that being said, we think referring to Lash’s theory as an enumerated-rights-only theory 
is useful. On Lash’s account, unenumerated rights are not secured against discrimination outside of 
the context of comity or against generally-applicable restrictions, whereas enumerated rights are 
thus secured.  
19
 See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: ‘Privileges 
and Immunities’ as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329  (2011); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause, Part III: Andrew Johnson and the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 
1275 (2013).  
20
 KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMER-
ICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
21
 Id. at xi (averring that “the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause included only 
those rights enumerated in the Constitution”).  
22
 Id. at 158-9 (arguing that Howard’s view fit “with the antebellum understanding of ‘privileges or 
immunities of immunities of citizens of the United States’”, according to which “citizens of the 
United States had a right of equal access to a limited set of state-conferred rights when traveling  to 
a state other than their home states.”). On Lash’s account, “enumerated” rights also include the right 
to vote for federal representatives and the right to the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 148, 300.  
23
 The “absolute” protection of a right is in contrast with a right solely being protected from dis-
crimination. So, for example, the absolute protection of the right to keep and bear arms means that 
no one’s right to arms may be infringed, and neither can that of the citizenry as a whole. A discrim-
ination-only protection would allow the entire population to be denied the right, so long as it was 
denied equally. As we explain elsewhere, “absolute” protection does not mean that a right may not 
reasonably be regulated. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An 
Originalist Theory of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
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Crucially, on Lash’s account, because the original meaning of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in Article IV allowed states to enact laws that discriminate 
with respect to the unenumerated rights of their own citizens, so too does the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On Lash’s account, 
then, scholars are correct to concentrate their attention on Howard’s explanation, 
as it provides “the most likely original meaning of the text.”24 But, scholars have 
generally misunderstood that explanation.  
This has not always been Lash’s view. Around the turn of the millennium, he 
expressed sympathy for the view that the Clause afforded absolute protection to 
both enumerated and unenumerated rights.25 In 2009, he announced that he was “no 
longer convinced” that Ohio Representative John Bingham—the Clause’s principal 
framer—“read the Privileges or Immunities Clause to have nationalized more rights 
that those listed in the first eight amendments.”26 Today, he holds that the Clause 
nationalized all enumerated rights—not merely those in the first eight amend-
ments—but only enumerated rights. 
As we will explain, the credibility of any proposed interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment must be measured, in part, by considering how well it accounts 
for the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This landmark legislation protected the unenu-
merated rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, 
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. . . .”27 
It is generally accepted that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to con-
stitutionalize these rights so they could not be repealed by a future Congress; to 
empower the federal courts to enforce these rights; and to empower Congress to 
enact legislation designed to protect these rights. Indeed, in 1870, Congress reen-
acted the entire Civil Rights Act after adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment just 
to be sure.  
Lash’s constricted reading of “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” makes it hard for him to explain how the Fourteenth Amendment 
empowered the federal government to protect unenumerated rights and thus how it 
secured the constitutionality of the 1866 Act. The 1866 Act, after all, protected 
against far more than discrimination against citizens sojourning in another state—
it guaranteed to all “citizens” the same bundle of listed rights “as [are] enjoyed by 
white citizens,”28 full stop. The Enforcement Act of 187029 reenacted the 1866 Act 
                                                 
24 LASH, supra note, at 232. 
25
 See Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill of 
Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 500 (1999) (opining that the Clause “seem[ed] tailor-made for the 
recognition of nontextual fundamental freedoms.”). See also Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Con-
vention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 
466 (2001) (stating that “[t]he Privileges or Immunities Clause . . . likely was intended to protect 
common law economic rights, as well as rights like freedom of speech and religion.”).  
26
 Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 460 (2009).  
27
 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27, now codified at 42 U.S.C. sec. 1981, 1982 
(1976).  
28 Id.  
29 Enforcement Act,  ch. 114, § 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870), now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
1982 (1976).  
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and guaranteed the equal enjoyment of a slightly smaller bundle30 of rights to “all 
persons.”31 Unless he wants to deny the constitutionality of this legislation, Lash 
must either (a) identify an unenumerated right to be free from discrimination that 
citizens can invoke against their own states; or (b) locate the power to enact such 
civil rights legislation in some provision other than the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.  
Lash has struggled to do either. At different times, he has located the authority 
to enact the Civil Rights Act in each of the four operative clauses of Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment: the Privileges or Immunities Clause (2011),32 the 
Citizenship Clause (2014),33 the Equal Protection Clause (2015)34 and, most re-
cently, the Due Process of Law Clause (2017).35  
In earlier writings, both of us36 have expressed sympathy for the view that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause affords absolute protection to unenumerated rights, 
such as those contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and authorizes Congress to 
                                                 
30 The Enforcement Act omits the rights “to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property” See id., ch. 114, § 16. We will discuss the significance of this omission, which, 
as Lash observes, seems to have been a consequence of the shift from “citizens” to “persons.” Kurt 
T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship between the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1464-6 (2017) (acknowledging com-
mon law distinction between the ways in which citizens and non-citizens could “hold” real property 
but denying that it entails the conclusion that the 1866 Civil Rights Act’s protection for property-
holding does not “protect[ing] a natural right of all persons.”).  
31 14 Stat. 27, 27 ch. 31, § 1 (1866); 16 Stat. 140, 144, ch. 114, § 16 , 18 1870).  
32
 Lash, supra note 13, at 407 (affirming that “ensuring that Congress had such power to enforce 
the equality principles of Article IV (and thus authorize the Civil Rights Act) was one of the con-
cerns driving the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment”; that John Bingham “also wanted to pro-
tect the substantive rights listed in the first eight amendments; and that “[b]oth goals could be ac-
complished through an amendment which protected both the equality provisions of Article IV and 
the substantive liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights.” Lash’s discussion of Howard’s reference 
to the “the entire mass of rights, privileges, and immunities found in Article IV and the Bill of 
Rights” two paragraphs prior, which reference Lash rightly treats as a part of an exposition of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, makes plain Lash’s belief that the means through which these goals 
were accomplished was the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Id).  
33
 See LASH, supra note 14, at 170 (identifying Citizenship Clause as “the text that constitutionalized 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).  
34
 See Kurt T. Lash, Root Digs a Deeper Hole: The Equal Protection of Economic Privileges and 
Immunities LAW & LIBERTY (July 15, 2015), https://www.lawliberty.org/2015/07/21/equality-and-
the-civil-rights-act-of-1866-a-final-response-to-damon-root/ (arguing that “Bingham refused to 
support the Civil Rights Act because: 1) he believed Congress needed an amendment granting them 
power to pass such an act, and 2) he believed that all persons should enjoy the equal protection of 
the law, not just citizens” and stating that “Bingham’s final draft of the Fourteenth Amendment 
fixed both problems by including an equal protection clause that protected all persons.”).  
35
 See Lash, supra note 23, at 1459 (adducing evidence that “Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment carried a meaning that both critics and supporters would have recognized as authorizing 
legislation like the Civil Rights Act.”). 
36
 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 60, 194 (2004); Evan Bernick, Yes, the Fourteenth Amendment Protects Unenumerated 
Rights: A Response to Kurt Lash, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2015), www.huffing-
tonpost.com/evan- bernick/yes-the-fourteenth.  
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enact protective legislation.37 Neither of us, however, has engaged with or re-
sponded to Lash’s most recent and unique two-class interpretation of the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the depth that it deserves. Nor 
have we evaluated his recent efforts to demonstrate that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process of Law Clause empowers the federal courts and Congress to 
protect unenumerated rights like the right to make contracts, among others listed in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.38 In this Article, we will do so.  
We will contend that Lash has provided readers with an abridged version of the 
Clause—one that reduces its originally-understood scope. In a subsequent article, 
we will advance a competing account of the original public meaning of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, and develop a framework that can be used by judges 
and legislators to identify the rights protected by the Clause, to thwart state abridg-
ments of those rights, and to evaluate congressional legislation that is said to be 
designed to protect those rights.   
Part I provides an exposition of Lash’s thesis.39 Because his arguments are com-
plex, and rely on diverse evidence, our summary is lengthy. 
                                                 
37
 For example, in an 1872 speech, Ohio Senator John Sherman supported the constitutionality of 
what would eventually become the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by linking the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause to the “other rights retained by the people” that are affirmed in the Ninth Amendment.  
[T]he ordinary rights of citizenship, which no law has ever attempted to define exactly, the 
privileges, immunities, and rights, (because I do not distinguish between them and cannot 
do it,) of citizens of the United States . . . our fathers did not attempt to enumerate. They 
expressly said in the ninth amendment that they would not attempt to enumerate these 
rights; they were innumerable, depending upon the laws and the courts as from time to time 
administered. 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.app. at 26 (1872).  
Those “innumerable” rights to which the Ninth Amendment refers include the individual natu-
ral rights that “make it possible for each person to pursue happiness while living in close proximity 
to others and for civil societies to achieve peace and prosperity.” See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 29, 
at 266-55; Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 
(2006); Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to A Textual-Historical 
Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008) Lash agrees, although he argues as 
well that, in addition to individual natural rights, the “rights . . . retained by the people” also include 
a collective right of the people to self-governance. See Kurt L. Lash, A Textual-Historical Theory 
of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 895, 910, 912 (2008).  
That the courts and Congress must protect these rights does not tell us how they are to do so. In 
other work, we have maintained that this is done, not by defining and enforcing the rights them-
selves, but in defining and limiting the scope of governmental power. See Barnett & Bernick, No 
Arbitrary Power, supra note 17. But this issue is beyond the scope of this article, in which we are 
solely concerned with the original meaning of the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Get-
ting that meaning right is simply the first step; giving that meaning legal effect is the second. 
38 Compare Lash, supra note, at 928 n. 120 (emphasis added) (describing United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) as having rejected “the unenumerated right to contract”); 
Lash, supra note, at 1440 (emphasis added) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which pro-
tected the the right to “make and enforce contracts”, “constituted an effort to enforce the enumerated 
due process rights of national citizenship, not the unenumerated civil rights of state citizenship.”). 
39
 We follow the plan of Lash’s book for ease of exposition, with one exception. What Lash labels 
as Bingham’s “second” draft of Section One, we call his “third.” 
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Part II systematically critiques Lash’s evidence and arguments. We find that 
Lash’s Enumerated-Rights-Only—or “ERO”—theory has little support in antebel-
lum jurisprudence; that the evidence Lash offers to show that John Bingham, upon 
whose testimony Lash heavily relies, held Lash’s ERO theory is equivocal at best; 
and that Lash’s ERO theory was not widely shared by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
framers. We then explain why evidence from the debate over ratification does not 
indicate that the ERO theory was embraced by the public.40 
Next, we canvas post-ratification jurisprudence and congressional debates over 
various pieces of civil rights legislation both prior to and shortly after the Supreme 
Court’s fateful decisions in The Slaughterhouse Cases41 and U.S. v. Cruikshank42—
decisions which are generally regarded as having rendered the Privileges or Im-
munities a “practical nullity.”43 We find that the interpretations of the Clause that 
are contained in these materials are, for the most part, inconsistent with Lash’s ERO 
theory.   
Finally, we engage and respond to Lash’s argument that the political dynamics 
during the relevant time period made it impossible for any constitutional amend-
ment that delegated to Congress and the federal courts the power to enforce unenu-
merated rights to be ratified. 
Part III concludes.  
 
I. LASH’S THESIS 
 
A. Public Meaning Originalism and Terms of Art 
 
Our evaluation of Lash’s originalist arguments is made easier by the fact that 
we share his originalist interpretative commitments. In the preface to his book, Lash 
summarizes those commitments: 
 
The goal of this book is to illuminate the original public meaning of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. I define “original meaning” 
as the likely original understanding of the text at the time of its adoption by com-
petent speakers of the English language who were aware of the context in which 
the text was communicated for ratification. Determining original meaning requires 
                                                 
40 We will refer to “Lash’s ERO theory” rather than “the ERO theory” to emphasize that Lash’s 
theory is but one of several possible theories according to which only enumerated rights are abso-
lutely protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For instance, Justice Hugo Black famously 
argued that only the personal rights enumerated in the first eight amendments are absolutely pro-
tected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Black presented his view in Adamson v. California, 
332 US 46, 72-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 215-31 (1998) (defending “refined incorporation” of the Bill of Rights, pur-
suant to which judges should ask whether an enumerated right “is a personal privilege—that is, a 
private right—of individual citizens, rather than a right of states or the public at large” before iden-
tifying it as a privilege or immunity of citizenship). 
41
 83 US 36 (1873).  
42
 92 US 542 (1876).  
43
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 965 (E. Corwin ed. 1953). 
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investigating historical events and texts antecedent to the proposed amendment in 
order to understand the full historical context in which a proposed text is debated 
and ratified. This is not an effort to discover the “true” or even “best” meaning of 
antecedent events and texts. Instead the goal is to recover how these legal anteced-
ents were broadly understood, correctly or not, at the time of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.44 
 
Lash’s claim that widely-held understandings of “legal antecedents” informed 
the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause might seem 
counterintuitive. If Lash is concerned with public meaning, of what epistemic value 
are legal antecedents with which few members of the public might be familiar? 
Consider the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10.45 Scholars generally 
agree that the term “ex post facto laws” is a term of art—a phrase that was not part 
of ordinary discourse but which carried a particular meaning in legal settings in 
1788.46 During the ratification debates, however, the Constitution’s supporters pro-
vided public explanations of the meaning of the term and repeatedly emphasized 
that, because ex post facto laws were criminal in nature, the Ex Post Facto Clause 
would not prevent state legislatures from adopting retroactive civil legislation.47 
Through such public explanations, terms that might otherwise be unintelligible to 
members of the public who lack antecedent legal knowledge can become associated 
with particular concepts.  
More subtly, the concepts associated with legal terms of art may inform public 
meaning solely by means of deference on the part of laypeople to those with spe-
cialized legal knowledge.48 That ordinary citizen might be prepared to support the 
ratification of a word or phrase into law, knowing that its meaning had previously 
been established in legal settings and that that meaning would bind the public upon 
ratification. If one has a high level of trust in the framers of a document, agrees 
with the terms that one does understand, and regards the status quo as intolerable, 
it may be reasonable to defer one’s understanding to others in this way. 
Showing that a division of linguistic labor has operated in either of these ways, 
however, is no easy task. To make credible his case that technical “legal anteced-
ents” contributed to the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, Lash must establish both (a) that these legal understandings were widely 
                                                 
44
 LASH, supra note 14, at xiv. 
45
 U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 1. 
46
 See Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders’ View, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 489, 
501-4 (2003) (tracing the term through Roman jurisprudence through the common law to the debate 
over ratification). We do not here affirm this interpretation, but merely report it. 
47
 See id. at 517-22 (adducing evidence that “the majority of federalists addressing the issue treated 
ex post facto laws as criminal only” during the ratification debate and that this turned out to be “wise 
politically”).  
48
 As Professor Lawrence Solum has put it, an ordinary citizen might read a phrase like “ex post 
facto laws” and think, “Hmm. I wonder what that means. It sounds like technical legal language to 
me. If I want to know what it means, I should probably ask a lawyer.” Lawrence B. Solum, Original-
ism and the Natural Born Citizen Clause, 29 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 593, 596 (2008).  
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accepted and (b) either that these understandings were communicated to the public, 
or that the public deferred to the understanding of those who were legally trained.  
With these methodological preliminaries out of the way, we begin by summa-
rizing Lash’s attempt to make out this claim. 
 
B. “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the Several States” as a Term of Art: 
Bingham’s First Two Drafts 
 
Lash begins by parsing antebellum jurisprudence concerning the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV.49 He draws an initial distinction between use of 
the single terms “privileges” and “immunities”—terms which he finds “in an almost 
bewildering array of contexts”—and use of the phrase “privileges and immuni-
ties”—which he finds was “generally reserved to a description of specially con-
ferred rights” rather than “natural rights belonging to all people or all institu-
tions.”50  
It is worth pausing to note that the choice between conceiving of privileges and 
immunities as specially conferred rights, on the one hand, or natural rights, on the 
other, might not be as sharp as Lash makes it out to be. Eric Claeys has stressed the 
influence in pre-Civil War America of Sir William Blackstone’s conception of priv-
ileges and immunities as the positive law protections that civil society affords to 
the natural rights of its own citizens.  
As Claeys explains, in Blackstone’s Commentaries on American Law, “‘civil 
privileges’ refer to entitlements that replicate in positive law the general substance 
of natural rights. ‘Private immunities’ refer to the domains of noninterference Eng-
lish subjects enjoy as residual rights to do that which is not prohibited by particular 
civil laws.”51   
Claeys stresses the need for Fourteenth Amendment scholars to determine how 
“privileges” and “immunities” were “understood in context as terms of art for the 
civil rights citizens were entitled to enjoy in a republican political community”52 
and presents evidence that “an understanding substantially similar to Blackstone’s” 
was assumed throughout “the United States’ colonial period, Founding, and Recon-
struction periods.”53  
                                                 
49
 U.S. CONST., Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 1.  
50
 LASH, supra note 14, at 20. 
51
  Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or Immunities of United States 
Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 777, 792 (2008). 
52
 Id. at 821.  
53 Id. Although Claeys does not study the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment in any great depth 
and thus does not reach a firm conclusion concerning the contribution of Blackstone’s definition of 
civil rights to the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, he notes Senator Lyman Trum-
bull’s use, in a floor speech supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1866, of Blackstone’s definition of 
civil liberty as “no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further, as is 
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Song., 1st 
Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull) (quoting, with minor variations, 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 121 (W.S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1766). We would add as well 
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Lash then investigates antebellum case law and commentaries on the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause. His discussion of Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion in 
Corfield v. Coryell—which, as we have noted, played an important role during the 
framing of the Fourteenth Amendment54—warrants particular attention. Because it 
played so prominent a role in contemporary discussions of the meaning of “privi-
leges or immunities,” Justice Washington’s discussion of the meaning of “privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states” in Article IV is worth quoting 
at length: 
 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states. We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and 
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the 
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by 
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their 
becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles 
are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, how-
ever, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the 
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue happiness and safety; subject neverthe-
less to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good 
of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any 
other state, for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain 
actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, 
either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than 
are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the priv-
ileges and immunities or citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general de-
scription of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the 
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the 
state in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be men-
tioned are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities.55 
 
Lash argues that Justice Washington’s Corfield opinion was intended to com-
municate a comity-only view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause—one that  
                                                 
that Trumbull invoked Blackstone’s definition a second time to describe “rights belonging to a cit-
izen,” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull); that Senator Richard Yates 
used Blackstone to define a “civil right” as “a limitation or extension of the natural right as is con-
ferred by statute,”  id. at 101 (Sen. Yates); that John Bingham drew upon Blackstone in arguing that 
there was “no colorable distinction” between “civil rights” and “political rights”, id. at 1291 (1866) 
(Rep. Bingham); and that Representative James Wilson drew upon Blackstone for “[t]he great fun-
damental rights [which] are the inalienable possession of both Englishmen and Americans.” Id. at 
1118 (Rep. Wilson). All of this suggests that Blackstone’s definition of civil rights was “in the air” 
during the framing period. We will investigate the question of its influence in greater depth in our 
subsequent Article.  
54
  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 293 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 475 (Sen. 
Trumbull); id. at 1118 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 1836 (Rep. Lawrence); id. at 1835 (Rep. Kelley); id. at 
2765 (Sen. Howard) (citing Washington’s opinion in Corfield with approval).  
55 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551. 
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required states “to grant sojourning citizens of other states some of the same privi-
leges and immunities that the state conferred on its own citizens”56—and was un-
derstood to do so by legally-educated readers. From his survey of antebellum cases 
and commentaries on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Lash discerns “five 
possible approaches to Article IV, with one quickly emerging as the dominant in-
terpretation.”57 The dominant interpretation, he argues, was that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause was a “Comity Clause”58  
What has antebellum Privileges and Immunities jurisprudence to do with the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause? The answer given by most scholars is that the 
wording of the latter Clause was modeled on the language of the former. For this 
reason, understanding the substantive rights protected (from discrimination) by the 
former ought to help us understand the substantive rights protected (absolutely) by 
the latter.59 If any rights are absolutely protected by the latter, they ought to bear a 
substantial resemblance to the rights of sojourning citizens of other states that are 
protected by the former against parochial discrimination.60  
Lash challenges this consensus. He advances the novel claim that the language 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is “not based on the language of Article IV” 
because of conflicts that emerged in the Thirty-Ninth Congress over one of Repre-
sentative John Bingham’s initial drafts of the Clause—a draft that was based on the 
language of Article IV, Section 2.61  
On December 6, 1865, Bingham proposed the following amendment to the 
Constitution: “Congress shall have power to pass all necessary and proper laws to 
                                                 
56
 Id. at 22-3. 
57
 LASH, supra note 14, at 22.  
58
 We decline to adopt the term “Comity Clause,” despite the cumbersomeness of referring contin-
uously to the “Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Labeling Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 a 
“Comity Clause” threatens to bias evaluation of the evidence concerning how the Clause was un-
derstood by the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Lash recognizes, even if the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause was understood in 1788 to protect only comity rights, the relevant 
questions where the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is concerned do not 
involve whether the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood Article IV, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1 correctly but, rather, how they did in fact understand it and whether they understood 
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate that understanding. Id. at xiv.  
59
 See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 114-5 (1986); MALTZ, supra note 12, at 106-7; Richard L. Aynes, On 
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 53, 69  (1993);AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 177-9 (1998); RANDY E. BAR-
NETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 208-9 (2004); JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 208-9 (2011); Philip Hamburger, Privileges and Immunities, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 61, 132-4 (2011).   
60
 See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 114-5 (1986); MALTZ, supra note 12, at 106-7; Richard L. Aynes, On 
Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 53, 69  (1993);AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 177-9 (1998); RANDY E. BAR-
NETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 208-9 (2004); JACK M. 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 208-9 (2011); Philip Hamburger, Privileges and Immunities, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 61, 132-4 (2011).   
61
 LASH, supra note 14, at x-xi (emphasis added).  
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secure to all persons in every state of the Union equal protection in their rights, life, 
liberty, and property.”62 After detailing systematic state violations of “the absolute 
guarantees of the Constitution,” Bingham referred his fellow representatives to the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause and provided the following interpretation of its 
meaning: 
 
[G]o read, if you please, the words of the Constitution itself: ‘The citizens of each 
state (being ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to all the priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens (applying the ellipsis ‘of the United States’) in 
the several States.’ This guarantee is of the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States in, not of, the several states. This guarantee of your Constitu-
tion applies to every citizen of every State of the Union; there is not a guarantee 
more sacred, and more vital in that great instrument . . . 63 
 
Rights of American citizens “in” the several states connoted the fundamental 
preexisting rights of U.S. citizens that traveled with them; rights “of” the several 
states connoted state conferred rights.64 That Bingham understood the fundamental 
rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause to include rights set forth 
in the 1789 amendments can be seen in Bingham’s express reference to rights se-
cured by the Fifth Amendment as being among the “privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States”65 in prior speeches and in the subsequent evolution of 
the text of his proposed amendment. 
Bingham’s first draft amendment was submitted to the Joint Committee on Re-
construction, of which he was a member. On February 10, 1866, Bingham offered 
to substitute the following language:  
 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States 
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty,  and property (5th amendment).66 
  
One can see how this second draft began to track the two categories of rights 
identified by Jacob Howard in his May 23 speech, although Bingham is obviously 
here limiting himself to expressly protecting a portion of just one of the first eight 
                                                 
62
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). This proposed amendment was introduced to the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction on January 16. KENDRICK, supra note, at 51.  
63 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (emphasis added).   
64 We will confront the textual distinction between “in” and “of” again when considering an alter-
native to the Fourteenth Amendment proposed by President Andrew Johnson. See infra at notes 
325-8.   
65
 See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (listing “the rights of life and liberty and 
property, and their due protection in the enjoyment thereof by law” among “the privileges and im-
munities of citizens of the United States”); CONG GLOBE, 37th Cong. 2d Sess. 1639 (1862) (stating 
that “[t]he great privilege and immunity of . . . American citizen[s] to be respected everywhere in 
this land . . . is that they shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”).  
66
 KENDRICK, supra note 51, at 61. 
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amendments. That same day, the Committee adopted the new language and re-
turned it for congressional consideration and debate.  
On February 26, Bingham explained that his second draft was designed to en-
force existing constitutional guarantees that were not being honored by ex-Confed-
erate states rather than to impose new limits on state power. Here is Bingham: 
 
[T]he amendment proposed stands in the very words of the Constitution of the 
United States as it came to us from the hands of its illustrious framers. Every word 
of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our country, save the 
words conferring the express grant of power upon the Congress of the United 
States. The residue of the resolution, as the House will see by a reference to the 
Constitution, is the language of the second section of the fourth article, and of a 
portion of the fifth amendment adopted by the First Congress in 1789 and made 
part of the Constitution of the country . . . it has been the want of the Republic that 
there was not an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the whole 
people of every state, by congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these 
requirements of the Constitution . . . The House knows, sir, the country knows, the 
civilized world knows, that the legislative, executive, and judicial officers of 
eleven States within this Union within the last five years, in utter disregard of these 
injunctions . . . have violated in every sense of the word these provisions of the 
Constitution of the United States, the enforcement of which are absolutely essential 
to American nationality.67 
 
Lash infers from this explanation that Bingham believed tracking existing consti-
tutional language was “an important selling point to the moderates in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress.”68 However, Lash also finds that Bingham’s efforts to forge con-
sensus were unsuccessful.  
Democrats, encouraged by the recent Republican failure to override President 
Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, attacked Bingham’s amend-
ment as too great an intrusion upon states’ reserved powers.69 Lash reads some Re-
publicans as responding by echoing Bingham’s claim that the proposed Amend-
ment did nothing more than to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause but 
averring that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protected only the rights of so-
journing out-of-staters.70  
Conservative Republican Robert Hale of New York, in a lengthy speech that 
would be reprinted in full by the New York Times, expressed concern that the pro-
posed amendment was a “grant of power in general terms . . . to legislate for the 
protection of life, liberty, and property, simply qualified with the condition that it 
shall be equal legislation.”71 Hale went on to argue that since the “bill of rights”—
which he took to encompass all of the 1789 amendments, including the Ninth and 
                                                 
67 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (emphases added).  
68
 LASH, supra note 14, at 96.  
69
 Id.  
70
 Id. at 97-99.  
71
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1063-4 (1866).  
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Tenth—already “limit[ed] the power of Federal and State legislation,”72 Bingham’s 
proposed amendment was unnecessary and would serve only as an invitation to 
Congress and the courts to—as the Times summarized—“utterly obliterate State 
rights and State authority over their internal affairs.”73 
According to Lash, Bingham thus had to clarify that his amendment was 
broader in scope than certain of his supporters maintained while alleviating fears 
that it was so broad as to reduce the federalist system to rubble. On February 28, 
Bingham elaborated further the constitutional theory behind his proposed amend-
ment. This time, he explained why the Supreme Court’s decision in Barron—contra 
Hale—made an amendment to provide for such enforcement necessary:  
  
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that the citizens of 
the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; but they say, “We are opposed to its enforcement by 
act of Congress under an amended Constitution as proposed.”. . . 
A gentleman on the other side interrupted me and wanted to know if I could 
cite a decision showing that the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the 
United States courts the bill of rights . . . had been denied. I answered that I was 
prepared to introduce such decisions; and that is exactly what makes plain the ne-
cessity of adopting this amendment . . . I refer the House and the country to a 
decision of the Supreme Court, to be found in 7 Peters 217, in the case of Barron 
v. The Mayor and City of Council of Baltimore . . . 74  
 
Note that Bingham’s “bill of rights” included both the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process of Law Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which—as we 
have seen—he understood to absolutely protect certain national rights. This was 
not an idiosyncratic confusion on Bingham’s part. It arose from the fact that the 
first ten (or eight) amendments were not commonly called “the Bill of Rights” until 
the Twentieth Century.75 
As Lash points out, the success of Bingham’s needle-threading efforts de-
pended upon widespread acceptance of his premise that the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause of Article IV already required states to comply with his understanding 
of the “bill of rights.” Lash argues that this premise was not widely accepted. In 
particular, Lash claims that it was vigorously and successfully attacked by New 
York Representative Giles Hotchkiss in an influential speech.  
Hotchkiss made plain his “desire to secure every privilege and every right to 
every citizen in the United States that [Bingham] desires to secure.”76 He argued, 
                                                 
72
 Id. at 1064.  
73
 Amending the Constitution: Federal Power and State Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1866, at 2.  
74 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866).  
75
 See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS BE-
CAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2017).  
76
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).  
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however, that Bingham’s amendment failed to “provide that no State shall discrim-
inate between its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers 
upon another.”77  
Lash understands Hotchkiss to have argued that Bingham’s language would 
likely be taken to protect only the rights of sojourning out-of-staters—that is, com-
ity rights—and to have urged that the language should be made more “plain” in 
order to ensure absolute protection for national rights.78 After what Lash deems an 
unsuccessful effort on Bingham’s part to defend his proposed language, Hotchkiss 
held forth about the importance of clearly establishing “a constitutional right that 
cannot be wrested from any class of citizens, or from the citizens of any State by 
mere legislation.”79 
On Lash’s account, Bingham at this point recognized that no proposed amend-
ment that tracked the language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was likely 
either to be ratified or to be generally understood to protect more than comity rights 
and so chose to “go back to the drawing board.”80 When he did, he looked for other 
language that would attract less opposition and better suit his bill-of-rights-protec-
tive purposes. Lash believes that he found that language in the message President 
Johnson delivered when vetoing the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 began by declaring “all persons born in the United 
States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed  . . . are 
citizens of the United States.”81 President Johnson recognized that the Act directly 
conferred rights of federal citizenship upon those who had previously been denied 
those rights rather than altering state citizenship or rights that attached to state citi-
zenship. He posed the following rhetorical question: “Can it be reasonably sup-
posed that [groups previously excluded from national citizenship] possess the req-
uisite qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the United States?”82 
Lash believes that Johnson made a distinctive—and certainly unintended—con-
tribution to the amendment project in which Bingham was mired by distinguishing 
between rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause and “privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States.”83 In Lash’s telling, Bingham used 
this locution to achieve the end for which the language of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause proved unsuited—the communication of a concept of protected 
national rights that was neither too narrow to achieve enumerated-rights enforce-
ment nor too broad to avoid an intra-congressional veto by moderate and conserva-
tive Republicans.  
                                                 
77
 Id.  
78
 LASH, supra note 14, at 109.  
79
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).  
80
 LASH, supra note 14, at 109.  
81
 14 Stat. 27, ch. 31, § 1 (1866).  
82
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 1679 (1866).  
83
 See LASH, supra note 14, at 140 (crediting Johnson with “introduc[ing] the language of the rights 
of national citizenship into the legislative and public debate”). Lash offers no direct evidence that 
Bingham actually took inspiration from Johnson’s language.  
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C. “Privileges or Immunities of the Citizens of the United States” as a Term of 
Art: Bingham’s Third and Final Draft84 
 
Lash’s most novel contribution to the body of scholarship on the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause is the product of his exploration of evidence concerning the 
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” from what seems at 
first to be an unlikely source: Antebellum treaty jurisprudence.85  Lash begins with 
Article III of the Louisiana Cession Act of 1803 (“Cession Act”).86  
Article III promised the inhabitants of territory purchased from France that they 
would enjoy “all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United 
States” upon being fully admitted into the Union.87 This language, Lash argues, was 
“the common language of contemporary international treaties, and . . . clearly in-
fluenced later American treaties involving territorial cession” through Reconstruc-
tion.88  
To explain its meaning, Lash focuses on “one of the most extensive antebellum 
discussions involving the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens”—the debate 
produced by what were ultimately unsuccessful congressional efforts to secure a 
ban on slavery as a condition of admitting Missouri into the Union.89 Opponents 
urged that such a ban would deny citizens of Missouri “the rights, advantages, and 
immunities of other citizens of the Union” recognized in the Cession Act.90 Free-
state advocates argued otherwise.91 
                                                 
84
 Lash discusses the two versions of Bingham’s proposed amendment that we examined in the 
previous section: the version proposed to the Joint Committee on January 16 and the version that he 
moved to substitute on February 3. But for reasons he does not provide, he labels the third and final 
version that Bingham proposed to the Committee on Reconstruction on April 21, 1866, as his “sec-
ond draft.” The latter was identical to the final amendment, save for the absence of the Citizenship 
Clause, which would be proposed by Jacob Howard on May 30 and adopted on the same day. CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866). Because we think this necessarily imports confusion into 
a discussion of three of Bingham’s distinct formulations, we do not adopt Lash’s terminology. We 
instead refer to the April 21st version as his “third draft” or as the “final version” 
85 Lash is not the first to explore the relevance of this evidence to the original meaning of the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause. For what appears to be the earliest exploration of this evidence, see 
Arnold T. Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American People: A Disjunctive 
Theory of Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 765, 783-80 (1985). As 
the title reflects, Guminski reaches different conclusions.  
86
 Treaty of Purchase Between the United States and the French Republic, art. III, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 
1803, 8 Stat. 200.  
87
 Id. at 202.  
88
 LASH, supra note 14, at 49.  
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Lash devotes particular attention to the free state advocacy of New Hampshire 
Senators Daniel Webster and David Morril, both of whom distinguished the privi-
leges and immunities of national citizenship from the privileges and immunities of 
state citizenship. Lash writes that, although Webster and Morril provided “slightly 
different” lists of national rights, “[n]either list included any natural or common 
law liberties beyond those listed in the Federal Constitution, much less rights or 
immunities derived from state law.”92 Rather, they included only constitutionally 
enumerated rights.  
Lash also finds that some free-state advocates associated the privileges and im-
munities of national citizenship with the “rights, privileges, and immunities” of the 
Cession Act and the privileges and immunities of state citizenship with the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. Webster maintained that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause only “secures to the migrating citizen all the privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the State to which he removes,” not “all the privileges and immunities 
of the citizens of every other State, at the same time under all circumstances.”93 For 
that reason, Webster argued, “the citizens of Louisiana, upon their admission into 
the Union, in receiving the benefit of this clause, would not enjoy higher, or more 
extensive rights than the citizens of Ohio” to force slavery into other states, even 
though they were entitled under the Cession Act to the enjoyment of enumerated 
federal constitutional rights.94  
Lash points out that certain of the above free-state arguments were republished 
multiple times, including three years before the Civil War.95 One way or the other, 
Lash contends that they came to the attention of John Bingham and “inform[ed] 
[his] final draft of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”96  
Precisely how Bingham happened to conclude that the language of privileges 
and immunities “of citizens of the United States” would serve his desired ends is 
not clear on Lash’s account. Nor does Lash adduce any evidence from antebellum 
jurisprudence in support of the free state ERO theory’s influence following the ad-
mission of Missouri as a slave state—despite his reliance upon antebellum juris-
prudence when discussing how Republicans understood the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause.  
On April 21, 1866, Bingham proposed that the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion add the following language to the emerging Fourteenth Amendment: 
 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.97 
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The language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was now gone, replaced 
with that of “citizens of the United States.” After this language was approved 10 to 
3 by the Joint Committee following a frankly dizzying series of votes,98 Bingham 
introduced the proposed amendment to the House on May 10.99 He stated that it 
would “protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of 
the Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever 
the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.” He 
then added that in doing so it “t[ook] from no State any right that ever pertained to 
it.”100  
Bingham went on to describe “flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges 
of citizens of the United States, for which the national government furnished, and 
could furnish by law no remedy whatsoever” such as the infliction of “cruel and 
unusual punishment . . . not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done.”101 
He drew attention to a South Carolina law that required “‘citizens of the United 
States’ to abjure their allegiance to every other government or authority than that 
of the State of South Carolina.” It was, said Bingham, 
 
an opprobrium to the Republic that for fidelity to the United States they could not 
by national law be protected against the degrading punishment inflicted on slaves 
and felons by State law. The great want of the citizen and stranger, protection by 
national law from unconstitutional state enactments, is supplied by the first section 
of this amendment. That is the extent it hath, no more.102 
 
Lash interprets Bingham’s statement that the proposed amendment did “no 
more” than to protect “citizen and stranger . . . from unconstitutional state enact-
ments” to reflect a “moderate position that the states remained an important con-
stituent part of American constitutional government.”103 Bingham stressed that 
Congress’s power to protect privileges and immunities did not encompass the “reg-
ulat[ion] [of] suffrage in the several states” and insisted that his amendment sup-
plied power to enforce existing constitutional obligations, as much as certain of his 
radical colleagues might have wanted to—in Lash’s words— “nationalize[] the 
subject of civil rights and place[] the entire matter under federal control.”104  
Lash then confronts what he aptly describes as “probably the most studied 
speech of the Thirty-Ninth Congress regarding the Fourteenth Amendment”—Ja-
cob Howard’s introduction of the proposed amendment to the full Senate on May 
23.105 As we saw in the Introduction, Howard cited with approval Justice Washing-
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ton’s exposition in Corfield of “the character of the privileges and immunities spo-
ken of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.”106 Howard 
then added, “[t]o these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they 
are not and cannot be fully defined in their extent and precise nature—to these 
should be added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first amendments 
of the Constitution.”107  
After providing a partial list of those personal rights, Howard recapitulated his 
understanding of the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Now, sir, 
here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of them secured by the 
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, which I have recited, some 
by the first eight amendments of the Constitution.”108  
Although this recapitulation has been read by a number of scholars109 as com-
municating that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would absolutely protect un-
enumerated fundamental rights associated with the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, as well as the personal rights set forth in the first eight amendments, Lash 
reads it differently: 
 
If you look closely at the quote, you will see that Howard’s reference to privileges 
and immunities that “are not and cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and 
precise nature” was a reference to rights “secured by the second section of the 
fourth article of the Constitution,” the Comity Clause . . . There is nothing in How-
ard’s speech . . . that suggests Howard believed the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause transformed the equally protected state-secured rights of the Comity Clause 
into substantive nonenumerated rights of national citizenship. Instead, it appears 
that Howard simply included the equally protected ‘privileges and immunities’ of 
the Comity Clause as part of the constitutionally secured rights protected under the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, along with the other enumerated rights of the first 
eight amendments.110 
 
In short, Lash claims that, by referencing Article IV and Corfield, Howard 
simply added the sojourning citizens’ enumerated right to protection against paro-
chial discrimination with respect to (unenumerated) fundamental rights to the per-
sonal guarantees enumerated in the first eight amendments. Lash thus reads Howard 
as communicating an understanding of the “privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States” that is consistent with the ERO theory that Lash attributes to 
Bingham, Webster, and Morril.111 
Lash then turns to the public debate over the constitutional text that was sent to 
the states for ratification on January 13. But for the definition of U.S. citizenship 
set forth in the first sentence—the product of a May 30 proposal by Howard112—
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the language of Section One of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment is identical to 
that of Bingham’s third draft:  
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws. 
 
Lash begins his discussion of the public debate over the Fourteenth Amendment 
by focusing on newspaper coverage. He points out that both the New York Times 
and the New York Herald reported Bingham’s February 26 speech introducing his 
second draft and lamented that “the immortal bill of rights” had been neglected by 
the states, and that other papers recognized that Congress “was moving toward na-
tionalizing constitutionally enumerated rights.”113  
Lash acknowledges that “it is difficult to gauge the degree of public awareness 
of the content of the proposal, much less public understanding of Bingham’s par-
ticular theory of the Constitution,” given that (says Lash) Bingham’s congressional 
colleagues struggled to understand him.114 Still, Lash maintains that “anyone fol-
lowing the debate . . . would have known that Bingham was attempting to nation-
alize the Bill of Rights,”115 by which Lash means the first eight amendments. 
Turning to the text that Congress submitted for ratification, Lash finds that 
Howard’s introduction to the Senate was widely-disseminated and well-received 
across the political spectrum as a clear, good-faith articulation of the amendment’s 
content.116 He also highlights an essay in which Kentucky jurist Samuel S. Nicholas 
derided Congress’s “recent attempt . . .  to treat [the Bill of Rights] as guaranties 
against the state governments” as evidence either of “stolid ignorance of Constitu-
tional law, or of a shameless effort to impose upon the ignorant.”117 Lash infers 
from this reporting and commentary that “the general idea of the Amendment 
seemed to be getting through.”118  
That idea was further clarified, on Lash’s account, as a consequence of the John-
son Administration’s politically disastrous counteroffensive against the proposed 
Fourteenth Amendment. In October of 1866, Johnson arranged to have Secretary 
of the Interior O.H. Browning pen a letter attacking the Amendment.119 Browning 
argued that the amendment was both unnecessary and destructive of federalism—
that state constitutions already protected citizens’ constitutional rights, such as the 
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right to due process of law, and that the true “object and purpose” of the amendment 
was to “annihilate totally the independence and sovereignty of State judiciaries in 
the administration of State laws, and the authority and control of the States over 
matters of purely domestic and local concern.”120  
But just two months earlier, on July 30, a white mob organized by the New 
Orleans mayor massacred mostly Black marchers outside of a reconvened Louisi-
ana Constitutional Convention.121 Coming in the wake of this state-sanctioned 
slaughter, Browning’s arguments appeared both callous and wholly unpersuasive. 
Lash finds that even papers “traditionally disposed to support the President”122 pub-
lished editorials describing Browning’s letter as not only a “huge political blun-
der”123 but as wrong on the merits—as reflecting a failure to appreciate the need for 
the federal government to protect citizens from state-sanctioned mob violence.124  
The landslide Republican victory in the November 1866 elections constituted a 
rejection of the Johnson Administration’s Reconstruction policies, including its op-
position to the Fourteenth Amendment.125 Rather than merely exult in their success, 
Republicans took the opportunity to emphasize the importance of completing the 
hard work of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment. To that end, they continued to 
expound the amendment’s meaning, and continued to stress the importance of se-
curing the enumerated rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and due 
process of law. Bingham, in the context of discussing a proposed anti-whipping 
bill, described the “pending constitutional amendment” as providing for “all the 
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limitations for personal protection of every article and section of the Constitu-
tion.”126  
While Lash concedes that governors and state legislative assemblies “left little 
in terms of a historical record,”127 he argues that specific references to freedom of 
speech, peaceable assembly and petition, and use of the press as privileges or im-
munities128 as well as general references to Section One’s protection of “all . . . 
constitutional rights,”129 and  “all the rights which the Constitution provides for 
men,”130 provide “clear evidence that at least some of the assemblies were well 
aware of the substantive nature of the rights protected under Section One, as well 
as the textualist nature of the ‘privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States.”131  
By contrast, he finds that “[n]one of [Section One’s] supporters described the 
Amendment as nationalizing the subject of civil rights in the states.”132 Lash in-
cludes among the sources of evidence which support his ERO theory a series of 
articles published in the New York Times under the pseudonym “Madison”;133  
speeches made and resolutions adopted by the Southern Loyalists’ Convention;134 
and an essay published by Frederick Douglass in the 1867 issue of the Atlantic 
Monthly.135 We will address these three sources below in our critique. 
Lash also focuses attention on President Johnson’s proposed “counter-amend-
ment,” offered after six states had voted for and an equal number had voted against 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lash considers it important that Presi-
dent Johnson felt comfortable replacing the Privileges or Immunities Clause with 
what Lash characterizes as “a passive restatement of Article IV’s Comity 
Clause.”136 Here is the final version of Johnson’s counter-amendment: 
  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State in which they may reside, 
and the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the several states.137 
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Johnson’s counter-amendment did not shift momentum away from ratification. 
On July 21, 1868, both houses of Congress issued a concurrent resolution declaring 
that “three fourths and more of the several States of the Union” had ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment—thus satisfying the strictures of Article V—and Johnson 
acquiesced via his own proclamation of ratification the following week.138  
Lash closes out his discussion of the ratification debate by taking note of a 
speech delivered, and a letter published, by Judge George W. Paschal. Judge Pas-
chal was a former member of the Southern Loyalists’ Convention who helped found 
Georgetown University’s law department and was among Georgetown’s first pro-
fessors of jurisprudence. In a speech before the Texas House of Representatives, 
Judge Paschal applauded Congress for “defin[ing] citizenship according to an uni-
versal standard” and for safeguarding citizens against the abridgment of national 
privileges or immunities.139  
In a letter published in the New York Herald-Tribune, Judge Paschal again 
stated that “[t]he lines defining American citizenship will no longer be matter of 
doubt” and devoted additional attention to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.140 
Of the latter’s importance, he wrote that although “[l]aw readers are so accustomed 
to see similar provisions in the State Constitutions . . . they should know that the 
bill of rights has, by a common error, been construed not to apply to or control the 
states.”141  
In Judge Paschal’s words, Lash finds a succinct summary of a “moderate pro-
posal” that “did not federalize common law civil rights”—any such “radical pro-
posal” to do the latter having “no chance of passage” —but did “secur[e] those 
rights already announced in the federal Constitution.”142 The success of that pro-
posal was, Lash argues, made possible through Bingham’s deployment of a term of 
art with “a history stretching back into statutes and treaties of the early nineteenth 
century”, the “antebellum understanding” of which that was “brought . . . into pub-
lic consciousness through [Republicans’] explanations of the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause.”143 
  
C. Post-Adoption Commentary 
 
Lash is wary of relying upon post-ratification commentary as evidence of the 
original communicative content of the Fourteenth Amendment, owing to concerns 
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about its reliability.144 Instead, Lash uses original meaning to contextualize post-
ratification commentary. He begins with judicial opinions, including Judge Luther 
Day’s opinion for the Ohio Supreme Court in Garnes v. McCann145 and Justice 
Joseph Bradley’s circuit court opinion in The Live-Stock Dealers’ Case146 holding 
unlawful a Louisiana slaughterhouse monopoly, the constitutionality of which 
would later be upheld in The Slaughter-House Cases.  
Lash finds that the former is consistent with “the moderate reading of the [Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause] presented by John Bingham and Jacob Howard”147 
because it held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “includes only such privi-
leges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized by, the constitution of the 
United States.”148 Lash acknowledges that Justice Bradley took “a more expansive 
approach” in The Live-Stock Dealers but reads Bradley as distinguishing between 
Article IV “privileges and immunities” and Fourteenth Amendment “privileges or 
immunities,” just “as would the majority in Slaughter-House.”149  
Lash proceeds to discuss debates over women’s suffrage. Several months after 
the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, women’s rights advocate Vic-
toria Woodhull submitted a memorial to both Houses of Congress in which she 
argued that denying the right to vote to women violated the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.150 When Woodhull presented her memorial before the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary on January 11, 1871, Washington lawyer Albert Riddle drew 
upon Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield.151  
In a report (“Woodhull Report”) submitted by John Bingham, who chaired the 
committee, the House Judiciary Committee responded that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause did not recognize any right to vote. Lash excerpts a key section of 
the Report: 
 
The clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States,” does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to privileges and immun-
ities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and immunities 
embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article 4, section 2. The four-
teenth amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities be-
fore mentioned, but was deemed necessary for their enforcement as an express 
limitation upon the powers of the States. It had been judicially determined that 
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the first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on 
the power of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of 
the provision of the second section, fourth article. 
To remedy this defect of the Constitution, the express limitations upon the 
States contained in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, together with 
the grant of power in Congress to enforce them by legislation, were incorporated 
in the Constitution. The words ‘citizens of the United States,’ and ‘citizens of the 
states,’ as employed in the Fourteenth Amendment, did not change or modify the 
relations of citizens of the State and nation as they existed under the original Con-
stitution.152   
 
The Report went on to cite with approval Justice Washington’s opinion in Corfield.153 
It is to Lash’s credit as a scholar that he presents the reader with the Woodhull 
Report because it seems flatly inconsistent with his interpretation of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause. The Report expressly affirms that the set of “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States” is identical to—or none “other than”—
the set of “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” and to the set 
described by Justice Washington in Corfield. If “article 4, section 2,” was generally 
understood merely to be a “Comity Clause” and Corfield to be a comity-only opin-
ion, as Lash would have it, quite obviously, the enforcement of this clause by the 
Fourteenth Amendment would not provide citizens with an absolute security in 
their enjoyment of even their enumerated rights, much less the rights included in 
the Civil Rights Act.  
Lash acknowledges that he can only speculate as to why Bingham signed off 
on this Report. In the end, he dubs the highly inconvenient Report a “historical 
oddity that tells us more about sloppy committee work than the original understand-
ing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.”154 This piece of evidence should nev-
ertheless be kept in mind when we turn to our critique of the ERO reading of the 
Clause. 
Lash then turns his attention to Bingham’s last, quite different words on the 
subject, delivered in defense of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.155 The Ku Klux 
Klan Act was introduced by Ohio Representative Samuel Shellabarger and was di-
rected not against hostile state action but against private conspiracies to violate the 
“rights, privileges or immunities of another person”—including by means of “mur-
der, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery.”156  
Some representatives objected that Congress’s Section Five powers to enforce 
Section One did not encompass the prohibition of private violations of constitu-
tional rights, being that the text of Section One forbade only “state[s]” from abridg-
ing the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens, depriving people of due process 
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of law, or denying people the equal protection of the laws.157 Shellabarger re-
sponded to these objections in part by invoking Corfield and averring that Justice 
Washington’s opinion listed “fundamental rights of citizenship” that Congress had 
power to protect.158 
On March 31, in a speech in which he appears to distance himself from Shella-
barger, Bingham stated the reasons why he chose to abandon his original draft of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.159 Bingham claimed to have been persuaded by Mar-
shall’s “great decision” in Barron v. Baltimore that the first eight amendments did 
not bind the states and to have recognized the need to supply language that specif-
ically did so:  
 
It was decided, and rightfully, that these [first eight] amendments, defining and 
protecting the rights of men and citizens, were only limitations on the power of 
Congress, not on the power of the States. 
In reexamining that case of Barron . . . after my struggle in the House in Feb-
ruary, 1866 . . . I noted and apprehended as I never did before, certain words in 
that opinion of Marshall. Referring to the first eight amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, the Chief Justice said: ‘Had the framers of these amend-
ments intended them to be limitations on the power of State governments they 
would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have expressed 
that intention.’ 
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the original constitu-
tion. As they had said ‘no State shall emit bills of credit, pass any bill of attainder, 
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts;’ I prepared the 
provision of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment as it stands in the Con-
stitution, as follows: 
‘No state shall . . .’160 
 
Bingham then articulated his own understanding of the Clause. First, Bingham 
denied that Corfield meant anything more than that “in civil rights the State could 
not refuse to extend to citizens of other states the same general rights secured in its 
own.”161 In short, Corfield equals comity. Second, he asked rhetorically: “Is it not 
clear that other and different privileges and immunities . . . are secured by the pro-
vision of the fourteenth article, that no State shall abridge the privileges or immun-
ities of citizens of the United States, which are defined in the eight articles of 
amendment?”162 Bingham then counseled the House to “follow the makers of the 
Constitution and the builders of the Republic, by passing laws for enforcing all the 
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 LASH, supra note 14, at 242.  
158
 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871).  
159
 Id. at app. 84.  
160 Id.  
161
 Id.  
162
 Id.  
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privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as guaranteed by the 
amended Constitution and expressly enumerated in the Constitution.”163 
Lash finds “little reason to doubt the sincerity” of Bingham’s interpretation.164 
He points out that, during the framing process, Bingham “never once relied on Cor-
field, much less natural rights interpretations of Corfield.”165 According to Lash, 
Bingham “[o]ver and over again refer[red] to the privileges and immunities of cit-
izens of the United States in a manner that reference[d] the express enumerated 
rights of the Constitution,”166 consistently with his claim that Congress could pass 
laws to enforce “privileges and immunities of citizens . . . expressly enumerated in 
the Constitution.”167  
Lash concludes by discussing the legal reception of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause. Lash begins with the Supreme Court’s 1873 decision in The Slaughter-
House Cases. In a majority opinion authored by Justice Samuel Miller, the Court 
denied that a Louisiana slaughtering monopoly that effectively put hundreds of lo-
cal butchers out of business deprived those butchers of their “privilege or immun-
ity” to pursue a trade.168  
Lash applauds Justice Miller for distinguishing between the privileges and im-
munities protected by Article IV and those protected by Section One. Although 
Justice Miller embraced Justice Washington’s definition in Corfield of “fundamen-
tal” rights for Article IV purposes, Justice Miller denied that the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause did more than protect the right to comity.169  
Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Miller contended that interpret-
ing the Privileges or Immunities Clause to transform the rights listed in Corfield 
into absolutely-protected national rights would “radically chang[e] the whole the-
ory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both 
of these governments to the people.”170 Justice Miller reasoned that such an inter-
pretation ought to be avoided “in the absence of language which expresses such a 
purpose too clearly to admit of doubt”—and he found no such language in Section 
                                                 
163
 Id. (emphasis added). Despite this limited reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Bing-
ham nevertheless thought the Ku Klux Klan Act was constitutional because groups of private actors 
were presently “trampling under foot the life and liberty, [and] destroying the property of citizens,” 
id at 85. Bingham urged that Congress could “enforce the Constitution” by dispersing those groups 
by force, without thereby undermining the “dual system of government” he regarded as “essential 
to our national existence.” Id. 
164
 Id. at 250.  
165
 Id. at 250-51.  
166
 Id. at 251. 
167
 Id.  
168
 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S., at 60. For a deep-dive into the opinions in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, see Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994). For a summary of 
competing scholarly narratives concerning the case, see Randy E. Barnett, The Three Narratives of 
the Slaughter-House Cases, 40 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 295 (2016). 
169
 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S., at 77. 
170
 Id. at 78.  
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One.171 Lash states that the results of his own inquiry “strongly suggest[] that . . . 
Miller was absolutely right.”172 
Lash denies that Justice Miller “clos[ed] the door on viewing the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause as protecting enumerated rights.”173 He points out that Justice 
Miller identified the enumerated right to peaceably assemble to petition the gov-
ernment, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the right to become a citizen 
of a state through bona fide residence in that state, as protected by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause.174 He laments, however, that Justice Miller’s opinion “is not 
clear about which textual rights are protected or how they are protected.”175  
In Lash’s narrative, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was rendered a virtual 
nullity, not by the Slaughter-House Cases, but, rather, by the Court’s 1876 decision 
in Cruikshank v. United State.176 The latter case involved the prosecution of the 
perpetrators177 of the Colfax Massacre—what historian Eric Foner has described as 
“the bloodiest single instance of racial carnage in the Reconstruction era”178—un-
der the Enforcement Act of 1870. In Cruikshank, the Court held that the right to 
assemble and petition was limited to the protection of assemblies, the purpose of 
which was to petition the federal government for redress of grievances.179  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that members of a mob that slaughtered doz-
ens of Black Republicans could not be indicted for “prevent[ing] a meeting for any 
lawful purpose whatever.”180 The Court also held that members of the mob could 
not be indicted for conspiring to prevent people from “bearing arms for a lawful 
purpose,” reasoning that the Second Amendment “has no other effect than to restrict 
the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look [to states and 
municipalities] for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of 
                                                 
171
 Id.  
172
 Id. at 258.  
173
 LASH, supra note 14, at 253.  
174
 Id. at 253. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S., at 79.  
175
 LASH, supra note 14, at  at 264 
176
 92 U.S. 542 (1876).  
177
 As Justice Samuel Alito would recount in his opinion for the Court in McDonald, William 
Cruikshank “allegedly marched unarmed African-American prisoners through the streets and then 
had them summarily executed.” McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREE-
DOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUC-
TION 106 (2008) (detailing how Cruikshank “ma[de] a sport out of lining” up two Black men “so 
close to each other that he could kill them with a single bullet”).  
178
 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 483 (1988). For two 
compelling recent histories, published nearly simultaneously see generally KEITH, supra note 110; 
LANE, supra note 164. After noting disputes about the precise number, Lane estimates that between 
62 and 81 Black Republican candidates who peacefully occupied the Grant Parish courthouse after 
a county election were slaughtered by a white mob, many after surrendering. LANE, supra, at 265-
6. Keith points out that the state of Louisiana placed on historical marker on the site of the massacre 
in 1951 which celebrated the death of “150 negroes” and “the end of carpetbagger misrule in the 
South.” KEITH, supra note 110, at xi. The number of whites killed—3—is not in dispute. LANE, 
supra, at 265. 
179
 Cruikshank, 92 U.S., at 552.  
180
 Id. at 553. 
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the rights it recognizes.”181 In sum, writes Lash, the Court “removed from the scope 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause the very violation of life and liberty that 
fueled the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.”182 
Lash concludes his discussion of the legal reception of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause by examining several treatises—the second edition of Thomas 
Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, published in 1871; John Norton Pomeroy’s 
1868 Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States; the second edition 
of Timothy Farrar’s Manual of the Constitution of the United States, published in 
1869; and George Paschal’s 1868 Annotated Constitution of the United States.183 
He reports that all but Cooley—who doubted whether Section One  “surround[ed] 
the citizen with any protections additional to those before possessed under the State 
constitutions”184—agreed “that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would 




Lash’s research on the Privileges or Immunities Clause is almost overwhelm-
ing. We have strived hard to convey to readers the true sense of the depth and com-
plexity of his analysis. One cannot but admire Lash’s energy, his attention to detail, 
his willingness to pursue the evidence, though it may take him into areas of law not 
previously considered relevant to his core interpretive goal, and the precision and 
clarity of his prose.  
Lash is presently under contract with the University of Chicago Press to pro-
duce a three-volume set of historical materials relating to the adoption of the Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments—a much-needed follow-up to Phil-
lip Kurland’s four-volume The Founders’ Constitution, which includes historical 
materials relating to the 1788 Constitution and 1789 amendments. Given his prodi-
gious learning, we cannot think of anyone better for the job.  
Before we proceed to commentary that will be primarily critical, it is worth 
singling out certain features of Lash’s analysis that we find persuasive.  
First, we are persuaded that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV 
was generally understood in antebellum jurisprudence to guarantee sojourning cit-
izens equality in the enjoyment of fundamental civil rights, not to “absolutely” 
guarantee to all citizens the enjoyment of such rights. Lash’s exegesis of leading 
antebellum cases is generally convincing.186 
                                                 
181
 Id.  
182
 LASH, supra note 14, at 267.  
183
 Id. at 273.  
184
 1 THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 313 (1871).  
185
 LASH, supra note 14, at 273.  
186 We are not, however, convinced by his analysis of Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 
Gen. Court 1797). As others have pointed out, the opinion’s author—likely Judge Jeremiah Chase 
rather than Justice Samuel Chase—used comity-only language and fundamental rights language. 
Thus, Judge Chase stated that the Privileges and Immunities Clause “means that the citizens of all 
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Second, we continue to share with Lash the view that the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause does not merely provide for the enforcement of the right to comity. 
Lash’s case against the comity-only-view advanced by Philip Hamburger187 is dev-
astating. As Lash puts it, “[t]here is just too much historical evidence to the con-
trary.”188 Further, Hamburger’s claim that freedmen “had little need for assurances 
of any particular substantive federal rights” appears unsustainable on the basis of 
the evidence presented by Lash.189 What good would the right to comity have done 
Blacks who were massacred by local mobs in their own states?  
Finally, we accept Lash’s claim that Republicans generally, and Bingham in 
particular, were concerned with securing certain fundamental rights associated with 
national citizenship without empowering Congress or the federal courts to act—as 
Justice Miller put it—as “perpetual censor [s] upon all legislation of the States.”190 
(Indeed, the dissenters in Slaughter-House denied the existence of any such impli-
cation of their more expansive reading of the Clause.)  
We reach different conclusions concerning how the ultimate balance between 
individual-rights-protection and state autonomy was struck. But we are persuaded 
by Lash’s arguments that “the more radical members of Congress” were unable to 
secure the ratification of an amendment that embodied their first-order preferences 
about the distribution of federal and state power.191 The federalism of the founding 
survived to a greater extent than it otherwise might have. 
In the end, however, we are unpersuaded that Lash’s core thesis is correct. In 
what follows, we will argue that “competent speakers of the English language who 
were aware of the context in which the text was communicated for ratification” 
likely did not understand the Privileges or Immunities Clause as Lash does. 
  
                                                 
the States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring and holding real as well as personal prop-
erty, and that such property shall be protected and secured by the laws of the State, in the same 
manner as the property of the citizens of the State is protected.” Id. at 554. David Upham has ob-
served that “[t]hese two privileges corresponded perfectly to two of the main privileges of subject-
ship: the right to acquire and hold real property and the freedom from aliens’ duties and restrictions.” 
Upham, supra note, at 1501. Chase’s language does not suggest that the first of these privileges has 
any relation to comity. See also Richard Aynes, Article IV and Campbell v. Morris: Wrong Judge, 
Wrong Court, Wrong Holding and Wrong Conclusion? (U. of Akron Legal Research Paper No. 09-
13, 2009), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1510809 (arguing that scholars have gener-
ally misunderstood Campbell, misidentified its author, and overstated its significance).  
187
 See generally Hamburger, supra note 49.  
188
 See LASH, supra note 14, at 281-3. Lash deals what appears to us to be a decisive blow to Ham-
burger’s specific claim that the language of a comity-protective privileges-and-immunities bill in-
troduced by Shellabarger inspired Bingham by pointing out, not only that Shellabarger’s bill was 
never debated or discussed, but that Representative James Wilson added an amendment to the bill 
which clarified that “the enumeration of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in this act 
contained shall not be deemed a denial or abridgment of any other rights, privileges, or immunities 
which appertain to citizenship under the Constitution.” Id. at 282. Wilson’s amendment strongly 
suggests that “members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress did not believe the rights of the Comity Clause 
were the only privileges or immunities of national citizenship.” Id. at 283.  
189
 Hamburger, supra note 49, at 71.  
190
 Id. at 78.  
191
 Id. at 69. 
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1.Lash’s ERO Theory Lacks Support in Antebellum Jurisprudence 
 
Lash’s case for the privileges or immunities of “of citizens of the United States” 
as an antebellum term of art that was used in connection with enumerated constitu-
tional rights (and only enumerated constitutional rights) is based primarily on evi-
dence drawn from debates over the admission of Missouri. There are two problems 
with Lash’s term-of-art case.  
First, Lash does not demonstrate that any consensus developed during the Mis-
souri debates concerning the distinction between Article IV rights of state citizen-
ship and the privileges and immunities of national citizenship, or that anyone who 
participated in the Missouri debates held the ERO theory that is key to his thesis. 
Second, Lash neglects other evidence that renders improbable the general ac-
ceptance of his ERO theory during the antebellum period.  
Careful scrutiny of the evidence Lash adduces from the Missouri debates re-
veals that slavery and free-state advocates held very different understandings of the 
same treaty language; that they advanced a variety of arguments in support of their 
respective understandings; and that it is unlikely that any consensus understanding 
of the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship developed.  
Slavery advocates, for their part, generally denied that Congress had the power 
to require Missouri to ban slavery because the “rights, advantages and immunities 
of citizens of the United States” included “the right to republican self government 
or the right of an entering state to equal status with the original states of the Un-
ion.”192 True, as Lash emphasizes, sometimes slavery advocates invoked constitu-
tional text, such as the Guarantee Clause and the Tenth Amendment.193 But Lash 
does not acknowledge that slavery advocates at other times relied instead upon gen-
eral political-philosophical principles and invoked unenumerated rights.194  
                                                 
192
 Id. at 58.  
193
 See, e.g., 33 Annals of Cong. 1195 (1819) (Sen. Scott) (arguing that “the most valuable and 
prominent” of the “rights, privileges, and immunities” guaranteed by the Cession Act to the people 
of Missouri was that of “forming and modifying their own State constitution” and that the choice to 
decide whether to recognize property in people was guaranteed by the Guarantee Clause, the Ninth 
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause).  
194
 See, e.g., 33 Annals of Cong. 1227 (Rep. Tyler) (1819) (arguing that the slavery ban would 
“tak[e] away from the people of [the Missouri] territory the natural and Constitutional right of leg-
islating for themselves” and  counting the latter right among “their privileges as freemen”);  35 
Annals of Cong. 1233 (Sen. Barbour) (1819) (arguing that “[a] State, to be sovereign and independ-
ent, must govern itself by its own authority and laws” and questioning whether Missouri can “govern 
herself by her own authority and laws, in relation to the subject of slavery” if it is required to ban 
slavery as a condition of its admission); 36 Annals of Cong. 1341 (Rep. Rankin) (1819) (invoking 
“right [of inhabitants of Missouri] to form their own constitution, and shape their own municipal 
regulations,” drawing no connection to constitutional text); 37 Annals of Cong. 563 (1820) (Sen. 
Smyth) (describing “right of self-government” as an “a natural inherent right of mankind” and 
claiming that Missouri became entitled to exercise it by recognizing slavery as soon as it “ceased to 
be governed as a Territory”); 33 Annals of Cong. 1231-2 (1819) (Sen. McLane) (appealing to 
“undoubted right of every people, when admitted to be a State, to become free, sovereign and inde-
pendent—free to make their own constitution and laws” and claiming that this right encompasses 
the right to hold slaves “if they please to do so”); 35 Annals of Cong. 197 (Sen. Edwards) (1819) 
(rights guaranteed by Article III include right of people of territories to “form a Constitution for 
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Nor does Lash recognize that some slavery advocates denied any distinction 
between the rights of state citizenship protected by Article IV and rights of national 
citizenship protected by the Cession Act.195 Indeed, as the debate raged, the General 
Assembly of Virginia issued resolutions expressly denying that distinction and re-
jecting the proposition that the “rights secured by the treaty are those only which 
are conferred by the federal Constitution.”196 
Of course, because slavery advocates were slavery advocates, there is no reason 
to think that Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress would have cared what they 
thought. But free-state advocates do not seem to have shared the kind of ERO the-
ory which Lash’s thesis depends upon. Yes, some free-state advocates argued that 
the “right” to hold slaves was unprotected by Article IV because it was not recog-
nized in the Constitution’s text. But those same advocates, as well as others, also 
argued that only rights that were uniformly held across the nation by similarly-
situated citizens were “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United 
States;”197 that slaveholding was not “essential to constitute [United States] citizen-
ship;”198 that Article III’s promise was limited to those rights in Louisiana in 1803, 
or to areas inhabited in 1803;199 that the Cession Act served as a general guarantee 
of equal footing to newly-admitted states but that the proposed restrictions were 
consistent with that guarantee;200 that congressional power over the admission of 
                                                 
themselves, upon republican principles”). But see id. at 245 (Sen. Otis) (denying that “the right of 
self-government in the people, or the faculty of making a State constitution” belonged to any but 
the “people of the several old United States, vested in them by the laws of nature and nations”). 
195 We emphasize that we are not endorsing the pro-slavery position. It is Lash who appeals to what 
he views as a consensus between anti-slavery and pro-slavery advocates concerning the distinction 
between Article IV rights and the “rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.” LASH, supra note, at 59. Our point is that Lash overstates the consensus, and that that lack 
of consensus undermines Lash’s term-of-art case.  
196
 Preamble and Resolutions, on the Subject of the Missouri Question, Pending in the Congress of 
the United States 122 (1819) (“Is there a class of people in this country, who are citizens of the 
United States, and not citizens of any, state, or territory, or district in the union? If so, how have 
they become such, and what rights do they possess? There are no such people.”). 
197
 See RUFUS KING. SUBSTANCE OF TWO SPEECHES, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MISSOURI BILL 15 (1819) (“federal rights” are “uniform throughout 
the Union, and are common to all its citizens.”); 36 Annals of Cong. 1379 (1820) (Rep. Darlington) 
(inferring that the right to hold slaves is not a federal right from the facts that “the people of Missouri 
may, themselves, exclude slavery” and that “Congress may prohibit slavery in a territory”).  
198
 35 Annals of Cong. 146 (1820) (Sen. Morril); See also id. at 206 (Sen. Leake) (denying that “the 
toleration of slavery is necessary for the self-preservation of the people of Missouri”).  
199
 See 35 Annals of Cong. 213 (1820) (Sen. Burrill) (Article III “cannot refer to persons already 
citizens of the United States who buy land and remove thither; such require no aid from the treaty.”); 
1 JOHN SERGEANT, SPEECH OF MR. SERGEANT, ON THE MISSOURI QUESTION 1, 33 (1820) (only those 
who were “inhabitants of the ceded territory, and subjects of the ceding power, at the time of the 
cession” can “call the treaty to their aid”).  
200
 33 Annals of Cong. 1209 (1819) (Rep. Tallmedge) (“If the proposed amendment prevails, the 
inhabitants of Louisiana or the citizens of the United States can neither of them take slaves into the 
State of Missouri. All, therefore, may enjoy equal privileges.”); 35 Annals of Cong. 213-4 (1820) 
(Sen. Burrill) (“Will [Missouri] not have her Senators, her Representatives, her Electors, by the 
same rules as other states? Must not all the regulations of her commerce, all her relations to the 
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territories was absolute and trumped contrary treaty language201; and that slavery 
could not be a privilege of citizenship because “what is gained by the masters must 
be lost by the slaves.”202  
Further, what arguments-from-enumeration free-state advocates did make do 
not reflect the influence of Lash’s distinctive ERO theory. Recall that Lash’s theory 
holds that all enumerated personal rights and only enumerated personal rights are 
among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship.  Although both Webster 
and Morril listed federal rights that appear in the constitutional text, neither listed 
any of the personal rights set forth in the first eight amendments.203  
Morril, observes Lash, listed rights relating to federal representation and to the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.204 Webster listed rights to federal representation 
and the right to a republican form of government.205 It is thus possible that both 
men understood the “rights, advantages and immunities” guaranteed by the Cession 
Act to encompass only what Lash describes as “constitutionally express structural 
guarantees” related to participation in and access to institutions of the national gov-
ernment on equal footing with citizens of other states upon admission to the Un-
ion.206 Lash does not consider this possibility, even though it would be consistent 
                                                 
Union and to the other states, be the same as those of Ohio or Vermont? Will she not, according to 
her population, have the same power and weight as other states?”). 
201
 33 Annals of Cong. 1209 (1819) (Rep. Tallmedge) (“The Senate, or the treaty-making power of 
our Government, have neither the right nor the power to stipulate, by a treaty, the terms upon which 
a people shall be admitted into the Union. This House have a right to be heard on the subject”); 35 
Annals of Cong. 215 (1820) (Sen. Lowrie) (“If, by the Constitution, ‘Congress have power to dis-
pose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting, the territory and other property be-
longing to the United States,’ and might . . . prevent migration and importation into the territories 
and new States . . . if the treaty diminishes this power, then the treaty is contrary to the Constitution, 
and in that article void.”); id. at 149 (1820) (Sen. Burrill) (“The power of Congress over this territory 
is sovereign and complete.”).  
202
 33 Annals of Cong. 1182 (1819) (Rep. Fuller).  
203
 We are not the first to make this observation. See Bret Boyce, The Magic Mirror of ‘Original 
Meaning’: Recent Approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L. REV. 29, 47 (2013) (“[A]s 
Lash himself points out, Webster’s and Morril’s discussions of federal constitutional rights involved 
“structural guarantees of federalism and access to federal courts,” not the guarantees of the first 
eight amendments.”).  
204
 David Morril, Remarks of Mr. Morril in the Senate of the United States on the Missouri Question 
(Jan. 17, 1820), in HILLSBORO TELEGRAPH (AMHERST, N.H.), Mar. 4, 1820, at 1.  
205
 WEBSTER ET. AL, supra note 80, at 15.  
206
 Other lists put forward by free-state advocates are similar in this regard. See, e.g,, 35 Annals of 
Cong. 183 (1820) (Sen. Mellen) (“The new state shall be entitled to two Senators in Congress; to 
Representatives in Congress according to the established ration; to Electors of President and Vice 
President; to the benefit of Federal Courts; the Constitutional guarantee of protection against inva-
sion; and all other advantages and immunities which are of a federal nature”); id. at 245 (Sen. Otis) 
(inhabitants of Louisiana shall “be eligible to be Presidents, Vice Presidents, members of Congress, 
and capable of sustaining all offices under the Constitution, civil and military, and entitled to their 
fair and proportionate share of all the great contracts and little contracts, and to all sorts of privileges 
and advantages enjoyed by any other citizen of the Union in that capacity.”). For an earlier articu-
lation of an equal-footing understanding, see 13 Annals of Cong. 54 (1803) (Senator Taylor) (“The 
obvious meaning of [Article III] is that the inhabitants of Louisiana are incorporated, by it, into the 
Union, upon the same footing that the Territorial Governments are, and, like them, the Territory, 
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with an equal-footing function of the Act that was identified by Secretary of State 
James Madison shortly before the Louisiana treaty’s adoption;207 by participants in 
the Missouri debate208; and by antebellum courts.209  That is not the ERO theory to 
which Lash is attached.  
We can, however, identify instances when the language of privileges or immun-
ities “of citizens of the United States” was used in connection with certain enumer-
ated personal rights as well, both during the Missouri debate and during the ante-
bellum era more generally. During the Missouri debate, Delaware Senator Louis 
McLane claimed that the right of states to choose whether to admit or exclude slav-
ery was as much a right under Article III as “the right to be represented in Congress, 
or the right to a freedom of religious opinion, or the right to have the slaves ac-
counted a part of their population.”210  
Lash also points to an 1835 letter from Attorney General Benjamin Butler, who 
wrote that citizens of the United States residing in Arkansas Territory who sought 
to frame a constitution without a prior enabling act by Congress “possessed the 
ordinary privileges and immunities of the United States,” including the right 
“peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for the redress of griev-
ances.”211  
It is important to understand why this evidence does not help Lash very much. 
Lash does not merely claim that the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens in-
cluded some enumerated rights. Rather, Lash advances the much more difficult-to-
prove claim that the language of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship was 
understood during the antebellum period to include all enumerated rights and only 
enumerated rights. We cannot infer that an all-and-only-enumerated-rights under-
standing was widely held from isolated references to particular enumerated rights.  
McLane cited no constitutional text for the proposition that states enjoy the right 
to choose whether to admit or exclude slavery, resting instead on general principles 
of popular sovereignty.212 To say, as Butler did, that the right to peaceable assembly 
and petition is “among” the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens is not to 
imply that the federal enumeration of a right is either necessary or sufficient to 
                                                 
when the population is sufficiently numerous, must be admitted as a State, with every right of any 
other state”).  
207 Madison’s outline of the Louisiana treaty announced the purpose of “incorporate[ing] the inhab-
itants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing” and 
thereby “constituting them a regular and integral portion of the union.” EVERETT SOMERVILLE 
BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812 66 (1920). 
208 See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 213 (1820) (Sen. Burrill) (“The true meaning of the clause must be, 
that the inhabitants shall be put on the same footing as other citizens of the United States, to their 
political rights, and to the same extent as if native-born”).  
209
 See City of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224, 235 (1835) (concluding that the 
treaty provision was designed to ensure “that Louisiana shall be admitted into the union as soon as 
possible, upon an equal footing with the other states”). 
210
 Louis McLane, Speech of Mr. McLane, of Delaware, on the Missouri Question (Feb. 7, 1820), 
in AM. WATCHMAN (Wilmington, Del.), Mar. 29, 1820, at 2.  
211
 21 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 1085 (1829-1836).  
212
 35 Annals of Cong. 1149-50 (1819). 
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make it such a privilege or immunity of U.S. citizenship. The right to peaceable 
assembly and petition might well be “among” those rights that belong in the family 
of “rights, privileges and immunities” because they were uniformly deemed funda-
mental to citizenship by states, federally enumerated or not; it might be among them 
because it is in fact fundamental to citizenship, even if was not uniformly deemed 
fundamental by states. Lash neglects these possibilities.  
The case law concerning the Cession Act, both prior and subsequent to the de-
bate over the Missouri question, does not suggest that an ERO theory was widely-
held.213 To discuss all of the cases in which antebellum judges interpreting such 
treaty language made no reference to any ERO theory would add considerable 
length to an already lengthy critique.214 We will focus on four cases.  
Less than a decade after the acquisition of Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in 1812 held that a Domingue refugee named Jean Baptiste Desbois who 
failed to report his arrival to federal officials in 1806, and thus never began the 
naturalization process, had nevertheless acquired citizenship through the admission 
of Louisiana into the Union.215 As a consequence, Desbois was held to be entitled 
to “all the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States”—including the 
federally unenumerated privilege of practicing law in Louisiana.216  
The same year, a Louisiana district court decided a case involving an Irishman 
known only as Laverty who was ordered by a federal marshal to move forty miles 
from the Mississippi River, pursuant to an ordinance applicable to enemy aliens.217 
Laverty argued that he, like Desbois, had acquired American citizenship through 
the Cession Act, and thus could not be subjected to such alienage-based disabili-
ties.218 A state court ruled in Laverty’s favor, and the Louisiana Supreme Court 
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upheld the decision below.219 The courts made no effort to ground the right to be 
free from alienage-based disabilities in constitutional text. Lash does not examine 
these cases. 
In the very year that Butler penned his letter identifying an enumerated personal 
right as one of the privileges of national citizenship, the Supreme Court of the 
United States strongly implied that certain unenumerated rights were also among 
those privileges. City of New Orleans v. Armas220 concerned a dispute over a lot in 
New Orleans that the city claimed was part of a quay and was dedicated to the city’s 
use in the original plan of the town. Those who currently possessed the lot sought 
to be confirmed in their rights and to enjoin the city from disturbing them.221 After 
a district court ruled in the possessors’ favor and the Louisiana Supreme Court up-
held the decision, the Supreme Court heard the city’s appeal under Section 25 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789.222  
In determining that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the controversy, Chief 
Justice John Marshall discussed the “objects” of Article III of the Cession Act: 
“One, that Louisiana shall be admitted into the union as soon as possible, upon an 
equal footing with the other states; and the other, that, till such admission, the in-
habitants of the ceded territory shall be protected in the free enjoyment of their 
liberty, property and religion.”223 Marshall then considered whether “[t]he right to 
bring questions of title decided in a state court, before this tribunal” was among the 
“rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States” and concluded 
that the answer was no.224  
Importantly, Marshall did not rest his conclusion on the ground that the right to 
bring questions of title decided in state court before the federal Supreme Court was 
not constitutionally enumerated. In fact, he argued that “[t]he inhabitants of Loui-
siana enjoy all the advantages of American citizens, in common with their brethren 
in their sister states, when their titles are decided by the tribunals of the state.”225 
The clear implication is that the constitutionally unenumerated right to have 
titles decided by the tribunals of one’s own state was among the “rights, advantages 
and immunities of citizens of the United States.” It just was not a right that could 
be protected by a federal court (as the Republicans would later rue). Marshall’s 
language does not suggest any awareness of, let alone reliance upon, an ERO the-
ory. Rather, it seems as if the “advantages of American citizens” are those which 
American citizens generally “enjoy . . . in common with their brethren in their sister 
states.”  
Lash also does not explain why, if the language of privileges and immunities 
“of citizens of the United States” was widely used to denote enumerated rights, and 
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only enumerated rights, Justices John McLean and Benjamin Curtis declined to use 
it for that purpose in their dissents in Dred Scott when responding to Justice John 
Catron’s concurrence. Justice Catron, drawing upon the Cession Act, maintained 
that because “Louisiana was a province where slavery was not only lawful, but 
where property in slaves was the most valuable of all personal property,” it fol-
lowed that the Congress could not “repeal the third article of the treaty of 1803, in 
so far as it secured the right to hold slave property” through the Missouri Compro-
mise.226 
Justice McLean responded by denying that any slavery-related guarantee ex-
tended “further than the protection of property in slaves at that time in the ceded 
territory,”227 and by pointing out that that guarantee had been complied with.228 
Justice Curtis responded by arguing that Article III was “not intended to restrain 
the Congress from excluding slavery from that part of the ceded territory then un-
inhabited,”229 and that it did not “secure to [inhabitants] the right to go upon the 
public domain ceded by the treaty, either with or without their slaves.”230 Relying 
upon Marshall’s analysis in Armas, Justice Curtis described Article III as a “tem-
porary stipulation . . . in behalf of French subjects who then inhabited a small por-
tion of Louisiana” rather than “a permanent restriction upon the power of Congress 
to regulate territory then uninhabited.”231  
Of particular relevance here, however, is the fact that neither dissenting Justice 
claimed that the right to hold slaves was unprotected by Article III because that 
right was not enumerated in the federal Constitution and so could not be among the 
“rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States.” Such an ar-
gument would have been expected, had the antebellum legal meaning of “privileges 
or immunities” been limited to enumerated guarantees.  
The silence is deafening. Lash does not identify a single case in which an ante-
bellum judge relied upon an ERO theory when interpreting treaty references to the 
privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship. Indeed, Lash does not show that any 
judge was even aware of the existence of such a theory.  
Recall that Lash’s term-of-art thesis depends, first, upon the alleged existence 
of a widespread acceptance of his ERO theory of the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship within the legal community. Then this understanding within the legal 
community must either (a) have been effectively communicated to the ratifying 
public by the Fourteenth Amendment’s supporters or (b) the public consciously 
deferred to legal understanding. The absence of any support in pre-Civil War juris-
prudence for Lash’s ERO theory makes the first step needed to get this theory off 
the ground highly improbable.  
Thus, we cannot put much credence in the existence of an antebellum consensus 
that the language of privileges or immunities of “citizens of the United States” was 
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widely used to denote a different set of rights than the “privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several states,” and we give even less credence to a claim of a 
widely-held ERO theory of that language. The failure of Lash’s term-of-art argu-
ment is not, however, necessarily fatal to the ERO theory. 
Bingham may have deployed a distinction between the privileges and immuni-
ties of U.S. citizens and those of citizens in the several states in 1866 that was 
sometimes used during the antebellum period to distinguish enumerated rights that 
were protected absolutely from unenumerated rights that were protected only 
against parochial discrimination. At which point, debate in the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress might have led to the development of a consensus within Congress that the 
set of privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens that would be protected by Section 
One consisted only in enumerated rights, and that those rights would be protected 
absolutely. After which, that consensus understanding might have been communi-
cated to the public.  
To be clear, this is not the argument that Lash makes on behalf of his ERO 
theory. Nonetheless, it is plausible enough to be worth considering in the next Sec-
tion. 
 
2. Lash’s ERO Theory Was Not Widely-Held by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Framers 
 
As we have explained, Lash presents Bingham’s use of the language of “privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States” as a solution to a twofold po-
litical problem. According to Lash, Bingham always wanted to empower Congress 
and the federal courts to absolutely secure enumerated rights. Over time, however, 
he perceived a concern on the part of fellow Republicans that the language of “priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” was too broad and would 
destroy federalism. According to Lash, Bingham also became worried that, because 
his reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was not widely-shared, the 
language of his first proposed amendment would be understood to protect only the 
right to comity.  
Due to these two concerns, Bingham searched for a Goldilocks solution, which 
he found in the term-of-art meaning of “privileges or immunities” that we critiqued 
in the previous section. But Lash produces not one scintilla of direct evidence that, 
when Bingham opted for “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” 
rather than “privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states” when ad-
vancing his second proposal, he took inspiration from antebellum treaty jurispru-
dence or sought to address the concerns about unduly broad and unduly narrow 
readings. Bingham never mentioned any treaty cases or commentaries or drew upon 
any treaty language in connection with privileges and/or immunities.  
As we saw, Lash contends that Bingham’s goals can be inferred from (a) Re-
publicans’ defenses of his second draft as merely protecting comity rights; (b) 
Hale’s critique of his second draft as unduly broad; (c) Hotchkiss’s critique of his 
second draft as both unduly broad and unduly narrow; (d) Bingham’s express ref-
erences to the “bill of rights” and to textually enumerated rights in his explanation 
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of his third draft;232 (e) his claim that it “hath that extent—no more”;233 and (f) the 
fact that Bingham’s explanation of his third draft “satisfied the conservative side of 
the House.”234 
Lash singles out commentary from Representatives William Higby and Freder-
ick Woolbridge, both of whom claimed that Bingham’s second draft would provide 
for the enforcement of comity rights. Lash claims that they understood his Article 
IV-based language to do “nothing more” than protect comity rights.235 This claim, 
however, is unsubstantiated.  
That Woolbridge in particular did not understand Bingham’s second draft to 
protect only comity rights can be appreciated by reading a portion of the commen-
tary that is presented and discussed by Lash. In this passage, Woodridge avers that 
the proposed draft is “intended to enable Congress to give all citizens the inaliena-
ble rights of life and liberty, and to every citizen in whatever State he may be that 
protection to his property which is extended to other citizens of the State.”236 Thus, 
Woolbridge is adding comity rights to the absolute protection of other inalienable 
(natural) rights. 
Nor do we perceive in either Hale or Hotchkiss’s critiques of Bingham’s second 
draft concerns related to Bingham’s use of the language of the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. Recall that this draft read: “The Congress shall have power to 
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each 
state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states; and to all persons 
in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.” 237  
Hale appears to have been concerned that the language would grant to Congress 
a primary power to “legislate upon all matters pertaining to life, liberty, and prop-
erty” as Congress deemed “necessary and proper,” not merely to take action in re-
sponse to state violations of the “bill of rights.”238 Hotchkiss seems to have shared 
this concern.  
Indeed, Hotchkiss made plain that he understood Bingham’s second draft to be 
a “grant for original legislation in Congress” rather than a means of “prov[iding] 
by laws of Congress for the enforcement of . . . rights” and indicated that, while he 
was “unwilling that Congress shall have [the former] power” he would “go with 
[Bingham]” if he were to provide for the latter.239 In short, Hale and Hotchkiss’s 
problem with this language might have more to do with McCulloch v. Maryland, 
than with Corfield v. Coryell. 
Lash reads Hotchkiss to have “s[een] nothing in the Amendment that implicated 
the federal bill of rights” and to have “presumed the proposal was nothing more 
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than an effort to authorize federal enforcement of the equal-access principle of the 
Comity Clause.”240 This seems wrong. Here is Hotchkiss, just before the vote on 
the motion to postpone debate on Bingham’s first proposed amendment: 
 
As I understand it, [Bingham’s] object in offering this resolution and proposing 
this amendment is to provide that no state shall discriminate between its citizens 
and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another. If this 
amendment secured that, I should vote very cheerfully for it today, but as I do not 
regard it as permanently securing those rights, I shall vote to postpone its consid-
eration until there can be a further conference between the friends of the motion, 
and we can devise some means whereby we shall secure those rights beyond a 
question.241  
 
Lash presents this language as evidence that Hotchkiss understood Bingham’s 
first draft to protect only the right to comity—that is, the equal protection of the 
rights of out-of-state sojourners within a state.242 But a comity-only amendment 
would not prevent any state from discriminating between different classes of “its 
citizens”; it would only bar discrimination against sojourning citizens from other 
states. Thus, Hotchkiss seems to have regarded Bingham’s amendment, not as fail-
ing to reach the necessary rights, but as failing to “permanently secur[e]” those 
rights because the decision of whether to protect them or not lay solely within the 
discretion of Congress. 
We agree with Michael Zuckert243 that Hotchkiss was troubled by the proposed 
amendment’s omission of an express prohibition on states violating privileges and 
immunities—to, as Hotchkiss put it, “provide . . . that no State shall discriminate 
against any class of its citizens.”244 Hotchkiss appears to have believed that Bing-
ham’s second draft “le[ft] it to the caprice of Congress” to prevent states from dis-
criminating as a consequence of this omission.245 Although Bingham maintained 
that the language of Article IV was sufficient to prohibit state discrimination, in 
Hotchkiss’s view, the amendment ought to have made “plain” that citizens enjoyed 
a “constitutional right that cannot be wrested [from them]” and it did not do so.246  
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So the real Goldilocks problem confronting Bingham appears to have been this: 
On the one hand, a “necessary and proper”-type amendment seemed to hand Con-
gress a plenary power to legislate on all matters concerning civil rights. On the other 
hand, the amendment did not bar states from violating civil rights. It was a lose-
lose proposition in both directions. We are thus unsurprised that Bingham’s next 
draft included language that expressly prohibited states from abridging privileges 
or immunities. Ultimately this state prohibition in Section One would be conjoined 
with a congressional enforcement power in Section Five. 
What of Bingham’s May 10 explanation of his third version of the amendment, 
which Lash claims represented a substantive departure from the first two drafts? In 
his speech, Bingham stated that Section One would “protect by national law [a] the 
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and [b] the inborn 
rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged 
or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”247 Lash says, “[i]in this pas-
sage, Bingham continues his longstanding practice of distinguishing the natural 
rights of all persons from the rights of citizens of the United States. The rights of 
equal protection are ‘the inborn rights of every person,’ whereas ‘citizens of the 
Republic’ enjoy an additional set of national privileges or immunities.”248 
Lash apparently bases this “equal protection” characterization on the next par-
agraph, in which Bingham observes that “[n]o State ever had the right, under the 
forms of law or otherwise, [a] to deny to any freeman the equal protection of the 
laws, or [b] to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Repub-
lic.”249 Presumably because the phrase “the privileges and immunities of . . .   citi-
zens of the Republic” is repeated in both paragraphs almost (but not quite) verba-
tim, Lash thinks “the equal protection of the laws” in the second paragraph must 
connect with the “inborn rights” mentioned in the previous sentence.  
But this reading is inconsistent with Lash’s current theory of how the rights 
identified in Corfield were to be protected. According to Lash, these rights are pro-
tected as an “enumerated” “Comity Clause” right not to be discriminated against as 
an out-of-stater, not by the Equal Protection Clause. While Bingham may indeed 
be implying, contra Lash, that certain Corfield rights are protected, not by the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause but by the Equal Protection Clause, Bingham may 
simply be referring to the differing protections offered by the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause. These two paragraphs, read to-
gether, are just too ambiguous to be certain. 
What about Bingham’s references to the “bill of rights”? We have seen that the 
phrase “bill of rights” was not deployed by Bingham solely to refer to what Lash 
regards as enumerated rights. Thus, in the course of defending his initial proposal, 
Bingham had characterized the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV—
which he described in 1859 as affording protection to the (unenumerated) right to 
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“work and enjoy the product of . . . toil”250—as part of the “bill of rights.”251 We 
will see him later associate these rights with the Declaration of Independence.  
True, Bingham discussed state violations of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause. But from this we cannot infer an ERO theory on Bing-
ham’s part from this reference to the “express letter” of the Constitution, any more 
than we could infer an ERO theory on Attorney General Butler’s part from his ref-
erence to the right to peaceable assembly and petition in his 1835 letter. The enu-
meration by Bingham and Butler of certain rights should not be construed as their 
denying the existence of others retained by the people. 
The same goes for Bingham’s assurance that the “extent” of his amendment 
encompassed only “protection by national law from unconstitutional state enact-
ments. . . . That is the extent it hath, no more.” This statement should not be con-
strued to imply that enumerated rights—and only enumerated rights—are protected 
“by national law” absent additional evidence that Bingham considered only viola-
tions of enumerated personal rights to be unconstitutional.  
Put another way, an ERO interpretation of this sentence assumes what it pur-
ports to prove. Moreover, the last time that Bingham deployed what appears to be 
a quote from Othello252—on February 28—he held an understanding of the “bill of 
rights” that included the unenumerated rights protected by the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause. If Bingham’s view of the extent of the “bill of rights” changed so 
as to encompass only enumerated rights, he did not say so.  
Yet another dog that did not bark was Bingham’s failure, at any point, to dispel 
the persistent controversy over whether the right to suffrage was among the “priv-
ileges or immunities” of citizens by invoking an ERO understanding. It would have 
been easy enough for him to do so if that was the consensus public meaning of a 
term-of-art “privileges or immunities.”  
Bingham might simply have stated that the right to suffrage, being unenumer-
ated in the text of the Constitution, was obviously not among the “privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States.” Instead, Bingham advanced the con-
siderably more complex argument that the “second section” of the proposed amend-
ment—which contemplated that states could deny suffrage to Blacks, so long as 
they were willing to incur the penalty of reduced congressional representation—
“exclude[d] the conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congres-
sional law.”253    
                                                 
250
  CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859).  
251 Id. In that same speech, Bingham denied that “the majority of any republican State may, in any 
way, rightfully restrict the humblest citizen of the United States in the free exercise of any of his 
natural rights; those rights common to all men, and to protect which, governments are instituted 
among men.” Id at 985.  
252
 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOORE OF VENICE, Act 1, Scene 3, lines 80-82 (“True, 
I have married her. The very head and front of my offending. Hath this extent, no more.”). See also 
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 48-9 (2013) (explaining that “[a] typical Bingham speech was filled with 
citations and scholarly allusions that few members of Congress could match” and that “[h]e was 
especially fond of history, Shakespeare, and poetry”).  
253
 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). 
 
Barnett & Bernick, Privileges or Immunities Abridged       ‖     Page 44 
 
Still, the language of the proposed amendment did change, and the fact that 
those changes apparently satisfied moderates and conservatives who had raised 
concerns about Bingham’s initial proposal requires some explanation. We offer the 
following alternative to Lash’s.  
We have acknowledged that the comity-only view of the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause dominated antebellum jurisprudence. Alternative views, however, were 
“on the table,” in the sense of being regarded as legally plausible.254 One in partic-
ular became increasingly ascendant in public discourse in the context of debates 
over slavery. That view held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause established 
a floor of fundamental rights associated with U.S. citizenship that states could not 
abridge.255 We should not dismiss this view simply because its advocates often 
drew upon antebellum opinions that—as Lash has shown—are probably best-read 
as expressing a comity-only view of the Clause. As we will see, that’s not how they 
always were read by antislavery Republicans. 
Both anti-slavery and pro-slavery advocates gravitated towards fundamental-
rights views of the Privileges and Immunities Clause over the course of time. This 
convergence was driven in part by political imperatives. Anti-slavery advocates 
sought to secure the privileges of travel, economic pursuit, and speech against in-
creasingly racist laws enacted by Southern, Midwestern, and Western states that 
were designed to exclude free Blacks from state borders, deny them economic op-
portunities, and stifle any criticism of the “peculiar institution.”256  
Pro-slavery advocates sought security for their property in enslaved people 
against increasingly stringent antislavery laws enacted by Northern states,257 and to 
reduce to absurdity arguments for Black citizenship by claiming that, if Blacks were 
to be recognized as citizens, they would be entitled to vote and serve on juries eve-
rywhere, as well as to enjoy other privileges and immunities that many whites were 
determined to deny them.258 Both sides thus had compelling practical reasons to 
develop constitutional arguments for a national floor of fundamental citizenship 
rights notwithstanding the commity-only reading of the clause by the courts. 
Because the Thirty-Ninth Congress was dominated by Republicans, the anti-
slavery fundamental-rights interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
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merits closest attention. During the 1860 presidential campaign, Republicans fre-
quently argued that the Privileges and Immunities Clause not only forbade Southern 
states from abridging the freedom of out-of-staters but also from abridging the free-
dom of their own citizens. Thus, former Congressman Joshua Giddings, who was 
among the founders of the Republican Party and was John Bingham’s friend and 
mentor,259 proposed the following resolution at the National Republican Conven-
tion in May of 1860:  
 
That we deeply sympathize with those men who have been driven, some from their 
native states and others from the states of their adoption, and are now exiled from 
their homes on account of their opinions; and we hold the Democratic party re-
sponsible for this gross violation of that clause of the Constitution which declares 
that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities 
of citizens in the several states.260 
 
As David Upham has noted, this resolution—which was adopted unani-
mously261—saw the Republican Party “formally endors[ing] an absolute-rights 
reading of the Clause, and one that would protect citizens even in their own 
state.”262 The resolution’s focus on the freedom to express “opinions” is under-
standable in view of the fact that Southern censorship effectively prevented Repub-
licans from campaigning in the South, but Republicans did not understand the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause to be limited in its coverage to freedom of speech. 
Antislavery governors, legislators, jurists, and editorialists affirmed that the rights 
to travel;263 to engage in lawful pursuits;264 to make contracts;265 and to be secure 
in their life, liberty, and property,266 were among the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship.  
These antislavery advocates were not ignorant of the comity-only reading of 
Article IV. Rather, they rejected it in favor of a reading that they viewed as more 
                                                 
259 MAGLIOCCA, supra note, at 42 (describing how Giddings took Bingham “under his wing” and 
“was his closest professional confidant”).  
260 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST THREE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIONS OF 1856, 1860, AND 
1864 165 (Horace Greeley ed., 1893). 
261 John Hutchins, Reminiscences of the Thirty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh Congresses XII, 12 NAT’L 
MAG. 63, 69 (1890). 
262 Id. at 1153 (emphases in original).  
263 See, e.g., W.A. Larned, Negro Citizenship, in 15 NEW ENGLANDER 478, 518 (1857); Alex. W. 
Randall, Governor’s Message (May 15, 1861), in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF WISCONSIN 4, 10 
(1861); Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1039–40 (1860) (statement of Rep. Henry Waldron); 
Editorial, What Shall Be Done with the Negro?, Nat’l Republican (Oct. 8, 1862), https://chroni-
clingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82014760/1862-10-08/ed-1/seq-2/  
264 Randall, supra note 263.  
265 See Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 975 (1859) (statement of Rep. Henry Dawes).  
266 See DANIEL GARDNER, INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 480–83 
(1860) 
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consistent with their understanding of U.S. citizenship267 and for which they found 
some support in antebellum case law.268  
For instance, in his monumental two-volume treatise on slavery, The Law of 
Freedom and Bondage in the United States, anti-slavery jurist John Codman Hurd 
dutifully recited cases in which courts “f[ound] the standard [of privilege and im-
munities] rather in the rights enjoyed by citizens domiciled in the forum of juris-
diction, than in a national standard of privilege.”269 However, Hurd then invoked 
Corfield270 and—hard though it may be to believe it—Chief Justice Taney’s dicta 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford271 for the proposition that there existed a fundamental-
rights floor that no state could fall below in its treatment of U.S. citizens.272 
Hurd understood the Privileges and Immunities Clause to “continue the pre-
existing common law of the colonies so far as it contained a standard of the rights 
of citizens of one locality appearing as domestic aliens within another jurisdic-
tion”273 and therefore believed that there existed “some national and quasi-interna-
tional standard of rights which are ‘fundamental and belong of right to the citizens 
                                                 
267 See JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 71 (1951) (coining and elaborating the concept of 
“paramount national citizenship”, according to which all U.S. citizens were bearers of fundamental 
rights that the federal government was obliged to protect in return for citizens’ allegiance and were 
entitled to equal treatment under the law vis-à-vis other citizens). For valuable discussions of the 
concept, see, e.g., Howard Jay Graham, Our ‘Declaratory’ Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 5-18 (1954); CURTIS, supra note, at 42-4, 81; Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham 
And The Fourteenth Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 57, 69 (1993); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional 
Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham's Theory of Citizenship, 36 Akron L. Rev, 717, 725-
9 (2003); Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: A Legislative History, 60 Am. U. L. Rev. 331, 375-
80 (2010); Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. 
& Liberty 115, 121-32 (2010). One of us has traced paramount national citizenship’s abolitionist 
roots. See Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One? Whence Comes Section One?: The Abo-
litionist Origins ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165, 205-9, 224-9 (2011) (sum-
marizing citizenship in the thought of Lysander Spooner and Joel Tiffany).  
268 The Ohio Supreme Court embraced the fundamental-rights view in 1844. See Wm. H. Williams, 
The Arrest of Non-Residents for Debt—Constitutionality of the Law, 2 Western L.J. 265, 266 (1844). 
Judge Nathaniel Reed wrote that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was designed “not to secure 
to the non-resident the same rights and indulgence with the resident in every State, but simply to 
secure to the citizen of the United States, whether a State resident or not, the full enjoyment of all 
the rights of citizenship, in every State throughout the Union.” Id. at 267. In so doing, he used the 
ellipsis formulation that fellow Ohioan John Bingham would later deploy: “That ‘the citizens (of 
the United States) of each State,’ or belonging to each State, ‘shall be entitled to all the privileges 
and immunities of citizens (of the United States) in the several States.’” Id. at 266.  
269
 2 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 352 
(1862). 
270 Id. at 351 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)).  
271 Id. at 291–92, 347 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 416–17, 428 (1857)). Lash’s 
argument that Taney intended to communicate a comity-only view is persuasive. See LASH, supra 
note, at 40-2. 
272 Id. at 351. 
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of free governments.’”274 Hurd and other antislavery advocates275 thus used judicial 
opinions that Lash regards as comity-only opinions to support a fundamental-rights 
view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  
Lash nonetheless presents Bingham’s fundamental-rights view of the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause as idiosyncratic and contends that he was forced to alter the 
language of the second draft because his colleagues understood it to protect only 
comity rights. But the fundamental-rights view was not idiosyncratic amongst Re-
publicans, and Bingham’s changes admit of a more plausible explanation.   
In observing that Bingham’s changes satisfied his fellow Republicans, Lash 
draws upon the research of Earl Maltz, who identifies five Republicans who 
“voiced federalism-based concerns regarding Bingham’s initial proposal”—Ros-
coe Conkling, Thomas Davis, Hale, Hotchkiss, and William Stewart.276 We have 
already discussed the objections of Hale and Hotchkiss.  
Conkling said little, other than that he objected to the amendment for reasons 
“entirely opposite to those . . . given” by Hotchkiss and that he thought “no objec-
tion is to be made to this proposed amendment because it does not go far enough 
or because it is not sufficiently radical.”277 Davis echoed Hale and Hotchkiss’s con-
cerns that Bingham’s second draft would grant Congress the power to enact “orig-
inal legislation.”278 Stewart considered the language of privileges and immunities 
not to be “material” and instead focused his critical attention on how the first pro-
posal empowered Congress to “make all the laws in all the States affecting the pro-
tection of either life, liberty, or property, precisely similar.”279  
Like Hale, Hotchkiss, and Davis, Stewart understood this to be an effective 
grant of primary power that would enable Congress to “legislate fully upon all sub-
jects affecting life, liberty, and property, and in this way secure uniformity and 
equal protection to all persons in the several states.”280 Thus, all of the concerned 
federalists in this group who elaborated upon their objections understood Bing-
ham’s second draft to grant primary legislative power to Congress and objected on 
the basis of this understanding. None took issue with the language of privileges and 
immunities.  
We have already suggested that the “primary power” problem with Bingham’s 
first two proposals stemmed from the grant of a capacious “necessary and proper” 
                                                 
274 Id.  
275 See, e.g., Larned, supra note 263, at 517 (endorsing Taney’s definition of the “privilege[s] of a 
general citizenship in the United States” and describing it as the “strongest portion of Judge Taney’s 
argument”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 3032–33 (1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson) 
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citizenship); Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 302–03 (1866) (quoting Dred Scott, 19 How. at 422–23) 
(citing Taney’s dicta and holding void state constitutional provisions that forbade Blacks from mak-
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 MALTZ, supra note 12, at 59.  
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 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).  
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 Id. at 1087 (Rep. Davis). 
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legislative power in Congress. We think the best interpretation of Bingham’s ap-
parent success in satisfying Davis, Hale, Hotchkiss, and Stewart with his third pro-
posal is that, by eliminating this grant of legislative power, it plainly no longer 
conferred primary legislative power upon Congress. In addition, the third proposal, 
by adding “No state shall,” now plainly did expressly prohibit states from engaging 
in discrimination, assuaging one of Hotchkiss’s concerns. 
As to Conkling, his change in position may have had nothing to do with the 
changed language. He appears to have opposed even Bingham’s third and final draft 
until the very end of the Joint Committee’s deliberations, when it became clear both 
that Bingham’s final draft would be part of the proposed amendment and that the 
amendment would pass the House.281  
To attribute Bingham’s success in satisfying concerned fellow federalists to the 
language of “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” is to blink 
the reality that none of those federalists raised concerns about the original language 
of “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” in the first place, and 
other changes in the language were responsive to the concerns that Davis, Hale, 
Hotchkiss, and Stewart actually did raise.  
Suppose, however, that Lash is correct that Bingham’s language change was 
inspired by his concern that the language of Article IV would have been understood 
only to refer to comity rights. Lash would still need to demonstrate that Bingham’s 
new language was understood to secure absolute protection only for enumerated 
rights. We have seen that Lash’s case for the status of “privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States” as a term-of-art denoting all-and-only enumerated 
rights is weak. But, perhaps Lash’s ERO theory was somehow communicated in 
the course of congressional debate or during the ratification process.  
We have already noted that Bingham never drew upon treaty jurisprudence 
when explaining his revised language. Lash adduces no evidence at all that anyone 
during the congressional debate made the connection between Bingham’s revised 
language and antebellum treaty jurisprudence. When treaties were mentioned, they 
were mentioned in connection with the citizenship declaration in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866282 and Howard’s later-proposed Citizenship Clause, not the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause.283  
Lash might reply that the connection was so obvious that no one considered it 
necessary to mention it. But, as we have seen, it is not obvious that the connection 
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 Zuckert, supra note 227, at 146 (“The evidence from the journal of the Joint Committee . . . 
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282 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 122 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull) (referring to treaties 
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would have been obvious. Lash has failed to show that any ERO theory exerted any 
substantial influence on antebellum jurisprudence, to say nothing of the particular 
ERO theory on which he rests his thesis.   
Which brings us, once more, to Howard’s May 23 introduction of the third and 
final version of the Clause, with which we began this Article. Nothing in this speech 
seems, on its face, to have been intended by Howard to communicate an ERO un-
derstanding. To the contrary, Howard’s reference to the “a mass of privileges, im-
munities, and rights” suggests no differentiation between those rights which are 
“secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution”—which he 
mentions first—and those which are secured “by the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution.”284 
Lash reads Howard as drawing upon Justice Washington’s discussion of Article 
IV privileges and immunities in Corfield only for the purpose of explaining that 
“citizens of the United States had a right of equal access to a limited set of state-
conferred rights when traveling to a state other than their home state.”285  
Lash emphasizes that Howard concludes his quotation from Corfield by ex-
plaining that “such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in 
the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution” and only then states that 
“[t]o these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and 
cannot be fully defined in their extent and precise nature—to these should be added 
the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments.”286  
This framing, Lash contends, served to distinguish the right to comity protected 
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause from the enumerated rights protected by 
the first eight amendments, and to communicate that only the latter rights would be 
absolutely protected.287  
This reading is unpersuasive. To what did Howard intend that the “personal 
rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments” be “added,” if not to 
the family of “privileges and immunities” described by Justice Washington? How-
ard proceeded to describe a “mass of privileges, immunities, and rights, some of 
them secured by the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution . . . some 
by the first eight amendments” and to state as fact “that all of these immunities, 
privileges, rights . . . do not operate in the slightest degree as a restraint of prohibi-
tion upon state legislation.”288  
Referring interchangeably to privileges, immunities, and rights and grouping 
all such privileges, immunities, and rights—whether associated with Article IV or 
set forth in the first eight amendments—together in a “mass” strike us as incredibly 
obscure ways to communicate a critically important distinction between, on the one 
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hand, state-conferred “privileges and immunities” protected solely against discrim-
ination when sojourning in another state and, on the other hand, national “privileges 
or immunities” to be protected absolutely against state infringement.  
Moreover, when one considers that Howard’s reference to the first eight amend-
ments was apparently inserted into his speech as an additional passage—suggesting 
he originally was going to refer only to Corfield rights—it becomes even less likely 
that the extended discussion of Corfield was calculated only to explain the reach of 
one enumerated right: the “Comity Clause” right of nondiscrimination against so-
journing citizens.289 Indeed, after the inserted pages 2a and 2b, page 3 of Howard’s 
notes then continue: “By the first clause, each state is prohibited from restricting 
these fundamental civil rights of citizens, whatever may be their nature and ex-
tent.”290  
Assuming page 3 was originally written to follow page 2 on which Corfield is 
discussed, Howard was referring to the rights in Corfield as “these fundamental 
civil rights of citizens.” This inference is strengthened by his qualifying this by 
“whatever maybe their nature and extent,” which in the published version of the 
speech is explicitly a reference to Corfield rights. That Howard characterized these 
as “civil rights” also explains how Republicans came to understand the Fourteenth 
Amendment to secure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under 
Section 5, and to independently protect the rights listed therein in the event that the 
Act was repealed.291 
Lash attempts to draw support for his conclusion that Howard intended to com-
municate an ERO understanding from Howard’s subsequent opposition to the 
placement of conditions on the admission of Nebraska to the Union. Howard op-
posed conditioning Nebraska’s statehood on its granting Blacks the right to vote.292 
But Howard explained that his opposition was based on his disagreement with the 
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 Corfield is referenced on page “2” of his handwritten notes. The rights in the first eight amend-
ments are then inserted on pages “2a” and “2b” before the speech resumes on page “3.” See Notes 
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291 Indeed, at least one newspaper reported on Howard’s speech as if his discussion concerned only 
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“principle” that “under that clause of the Constitution which declares that the Con-
gress may admit new States into this Union, it is competent for Congress to annex 
as fundamental conditions any requirements that Congress may see fit . . . to remain 
as law forever.”293  
Howard understood congressional power over admission more narrowly as a 
power to “invest [admitted] states . . . with every power, every faculty, every con-
stitutional provision which pertains to any of the States in the Union under the Con-
stitution.”294 The admission power did not include the power to prevent states from 
legislating in ways that Congress deemed inexpedient, indeed, to enact “entire 
code[s] of laws” in order to “mak[e] provision for every exigency that arises in 
society.”295  
In sum, Howard was opposing a principle that would grant Congress primary 
legislative power over newly-admitted states. There is no tension between opposing 
that principle and supporting an amendment that would empower Congress to en-
sure that a limited set of enumerated and unenumerated rights sharing a certain 
family resemblance296 are not violated by states—whether they be newly admitted 
or have been in the Union since the Founding.  
Furthermore, there is also no evidence that Bingham and Howard were under-
stood by their colleagues to be communicating an ERO understanding, whatever 
they may have privately intended. We can safely set Democrats’ expansive inter-
pretations of Bingham’s language aside, given their compelling political incentives 
to misrepresent the meaning of that language in order to defeat the proposed amend-
ment. But we also find no Republican supporters of Section One voicing a clear 
ERO understanding, even though it might have enabled them to refute Democratic 
arguments that the amendment would guarantee voting rights to Blacks. 
Howard, for instance, contended that the right to suffrage had been “always          
. . . regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one 
of those fundamental rights lying at the base of society and without which a people 
cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a despotism.”297 On Lash’s account, we can 
only conclude that Republicans wasted a tremendous amount of time and courted 
unnecessary risk by failing to avail themselves of a comparatively cheap means of 
making plain that enumerated rights were categorically “in” and unenumerated 
rights categorically “out.”  
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3. Coming to Grips with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
 
Proponents of Section One frequently referred to the Civil Rights Act and 
claimed that it would be constitutionalized by Section One.298 On Lash’s account, 
it is hard to see how the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have done so. Recall 
that the Act guaranteed the rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property.”299 None of these rights are enumerated as such 
in the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the text.300 
Moreover, the Act did not merely protect those unenumerated rights listed in 
the Act’s text against parochial discrimination. It also guaranteed that all citizens 
would have “the same right . . . [to contract, property, security] as is enjoyed by 
white citizens,” regardless of state citizenship.301 On Lash’s account, then, the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause was not understood in a way that would give this leg-
islation constitutional safe harbor. 
And yet, not only did members of Congress widely assert that Section One was 
meant to so empower Congress, but Congress reenacted the Civil Rights Act in 
1870 to ensure its constitutionality. As we noted above, in his notes for his speech, 
Jacob Howard appears to have referred to the rights identified in Corfield as “fun-
damental civil rights.”302 
Although Lash has pointedly questioned the connection between the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 and Section One, noting in particular that John Bingham op-
posed the former despite his central role in framing the latter,303 he has never denied 
that Section One did constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, he has put for-
ward no less than four theories of how Section One constitutionalizes the Civil 
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Rights Act since adopting the ERO understanding. The first three of these theories 
were not fully developed. 
Theory #1: The Privileges or Immunities Clause Authorized the Civil Rights 
Act. In Lash’s second article articulating the ERO understanding, he wrote that 
“many members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress (though apparently not John Bing-
ham) looked to the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing a source of federal au-
thority to pass the Civil Rights Act” and affirmed that “[e]nsuring that Congress 
had such power to enforce the equality principles of Article IV (and thus authorize 
the Civil Rights Act) was one of the concerns driving the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”304  
But again, a mere Comity Clause could not have authorized an Act that forbade 
states from discriminating against their own citizens. And Lash did not demonstrate 
that, by 1868, the Privileges and Immunities Clause had become associated with 
“equality principles” that forbade states from discrimination against their own citi-
zens. 
Theory #2: The Citizenship Clause authorized the Civil Rights Act. In his book, 
Lash hedged on whether Bingham’s third and final draft would have constitution-
alized the 1866 Act. He points out that whereas the third draft “addressed substan-
tive national ‘privileges or immunities,’ including the Comity Clause rights of vis-
iting out-of-state citizens . . . [t]he Civil Rights Act . . . addressed equality rights 
that residents could assert against their own state.”305 Lash also raised doubts about 
whether the Equal Protection Clause might cover the Act, citing Christopher 
Green’s research for the proposition that the latter Clause “spoke of equal protec-
tion of laws, not equal laws.”306  
Instead, Lash claimed that it was Section One’s Citizenship Clause307—pro-
posed by Howard on May 30, 1866, just shy of three weeks after Bingham’s presen-
tation of his third draft to the House308—that “constitutionalized the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866.”309 Lash did not, however, explain how the Clause’s “definition of 
national and state citizenship” incorporated equality principles that were broad 
enough to authorize Congress to forbid intrastate discrimination.310  
Theory #3: The Equal Protection Clause Authorized the Civil Rights Act. In a 
2015 essay, Lash responded to journalist Damon Root’s claim that the Privileges 
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or Immunities Clause “protects unenumerated economic rights.”311 Although Lash 
agreed that the “Fourteenth Amendment protects unenumerated economic rights,” 
he claimed that Root “ignore[d] the difference between substantive rights and equal 
protection.”312 Lash agreed with Root that economic rights—including those listed 
in the 1866 Act—were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. But he now in-
sisted that they were protected by means of an “equal protection clause that pro-
tected all persons,” rather than by a Privileges or Immunities Clause that “abso-
lutely” guaranteed the enjoyment of those rights.313  
In effect, Lash treated the Equal Protection Clause as a generalized antidiscrim-
ination guarantee. Lash omitted mention of a Comity Clause reading of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause (Theory #1) and no longer referred to the Citizenship 
Clause (Theory #2). He also dismissed a suggestion—made by one of us314—that 
the Due Process of Law Clause might protect unenumerated rights.315 
Although the Equal Protection of the Laws Clause is treated as a generalized 
antidiscrimination guarantee in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, Lash’s 
originalist commitments required more support for his 2015 claims than he pro-
vided. A number of scholars have adduced evidence that the Equal Protection 
Clause was not originally understood as a generalized antidiscrimination guarantee, 
but, rather, as a guarantee of equal access to the remedial functions of the courts 
and equal treatment by law enforcement.316  
If these scholars are correct, the Equal Protection Clause might constitutionalize 
certain features of the 1866 Act—in particular, it might reach the right to “full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty”317—but it would likely not constitutionalize others, like the rights to “inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property”, which do not 
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relate to either the remedial functions of the courts or to treatment by law enforce-
ment. Lash did not rebut this narrower view of the Clause’s coverage in either his 
book or his criticisms of Root.  
Theory #4: The Due Process of Law Clause Authorized the Civil Rights Act. 
Having previously asserted the other three operative provisions of Section One as 
a constitutional authority for the 1866 Act, Lash now shifted to a theory based on 
the fourth—a theory he had briefly dismissed in 2015. In 2017, he published an 
article setting forth a more developed theory that, after all, the Act was constitu-
tionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause.318  
Lash adduced evidence that Republican supporters of the Act like Representa-
tive James Wilson and Senator Lyman Trumbull understood the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Due Process of Law Clause to embody the Declaration of Independence’s 
references to “Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” and to provide authority 
to protect “fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man.”319 Lash em-
phasized that the Civil Rights Act originally provided for the protection of “all per-
sons,” not merely citizens, and argued that, although the Act’s scope was altered 
because of moderate misgivings about Congress’s constitutional authority to pro-
tect all persons, the Act was always understood to be a means of ensuring the due 
process of law.  
Lash also detailed how, after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment re-
moved any doubt about the constitutionality of protecting what Lash awkwardly 
describes as the “natural rights of due process,”320 John Bingham—who had ini-
tially opposed the Act—voted for the Act’s re-enactment through the Enforcement 
Act of 1870.321 The authority for this reenactment, Lash argues, was supplied by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause. As we will discuss be-
low, Section 18 of the Enforcement Act provided that the 1866 Act was “hereby re-
enacted.”322 Section 16 of the Enforcement Act, in language that closely resembled 
that of the 1866 Act, extended to “all persons” many—though not all—of the rights 
protected by the 1866 Act.323 
                                                 
318
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319 Id. at 1423-28.  
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We agree with Lash that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause places limits on the content or substance of state legislation. We have else-
where argued that state legislators are bound by the Clause to pursue constitution-
ally proper ends related to the protection of life, liberty, and property, and that fed-
eral judges are required by the Clause to evaluate whether legislation is designed to 
achieve such ends or is instead arbitrary.324  
So, it seems obvious to us that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected some 
rights to life, liberty and property that all people are entitled to enjoy and that the 
Due Process of Law Clause safeguards against arbitrary deprivation.  It is unclear 
to us, however, why Lash finds it politically plausible that a Due Process of Law 
Clause that was understood to authorize the federal protection of the “fundamental 
rights belonging to every man as a free man”325 somehow made it through the Ar-
ticle V process but politically implausible that a Privileges or Immunities Clause 
that was understood to protect constitutionally unenumerated rights which only cit-
izens are entitled to enjoy would have met with similar success. 
Lash might respond by pointing to his caveat that “the precise content and scope 
of due process during the antebellum and Reconstruction Period remains . . . under 
scholarly dispute.”326 He has hedged his constitutional bets, stating only that “there 
was a clear core meaning” of due process of law that included the “equal right to 
due process” and “a judicially enforced set of fair procedures” prior to depriva-
tion.327 If the Due Process of Law Clause guaranteed only equal access to fair legal 
procedures, however, we do not see how Lash could claim that it provided consti-
tutional authority for either the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or Sections 16 and 18 of 
the Enforcement Act. 
Just as the Civil Rights Act was concerned with more than comity, so, too, was 
it concerned with more than equal access to fair legal procedures. Consider the 
“Black Codes,” uncontroversially among the primary targets of the Act. The Codes 
were enacted in ex-Confederate states in mid-1865 to keep Blacks in a state of con-
structive servitude.328 To accomplish this, they denied Blacks the freedom to travel, 
the freedom to engage in honest work on mutually agreeable terms, the freedom to 
marry across the color line, and even the freedom to leave home without permis-
sion.329 Equal access to fair legal procedures would mitigate, but not provide for 
the elimination of, the evils associated with laws that required Blacks to provide 
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written evidence of employment, forfeited their wages if they broke the yearly con-
tracts that were imposed upon them, or forbade them from leaving the South in the 
hopes of escaping social and economic oppression.330 
That the 1866 Act was understood to be directed at more than unfair legal pro-
cess is evident in its advocates’ description of it. When Trumbull characterized the 
Civil Rights Act as an effort to “destroy all the[] discriminations” in the Black 
Codes, he provided the following list of “laws in the late slaveholding states” that 
deprived people of the “privileges which are essential to freemen”: 
  
They provide that if any colored person, any free negro or mulatto, shall come into that 
State for the purpose of residing there, he shall be sold into slavery for life. If any person 
of African descent residing in that State travels from one county to another without having 
a pass or a certificate of his freedom, he is liable to be committed to jail, and to be dealt 
with as a person who is in the State without authority. Other provisions of the statute pro-
hibit any negro or mulatto from having fire-arms; and one provision of the statute declares 
that for exercising the functions of a minister of the Gospel, free negroes and mulattoes, on 
conviction, may be punished by any number of lashes not exceeding thirty-nine, on the 
bare back, and shall pay the costs. Other provisions of the statute of Mississippi prohibit a 
free negro or mulatto from keeping a house of entertainment, and subject him to trial before 
two justices of the peace and five slaveholders for violating the provisions of this law. The 
statutes of South Carolina make it a highly penal offense for any person, white or colored, 
to teach slaves; and similar provisions are to be found running through all the statutes of 
the late slaveholding States.331  
 
Certain of these laws—like the provision for Blacks who kept houses of entertain-
ment to be tried before slaveowners—could be targeted by guaranteeing equal ac-
cess to fair legal proceedings. But it seems clear that others—like the prohibition 
against Blacks keeping houses of entertainment in the first place—would not be.  
Lash highlights the expansive, natural-rights-saturated language that Wilson, 
Trumbull and others used in describing the rights that the Act would protect. But 
he does not seek to resolve the apparent tension between this language and the spe-
cific laws that the Act’s supporters sought to target, on the one hand, and a fair-
legal-procedure-only reading of the Due Process of Law Clause, on the other.  Nor 
does he articulate the theory of due process of law which they held.  
The language used by the Act’s supporters in connection with the due process 
of law seems to us to be consistent with an understanding that the due process of 
law prohibited all legislation that deprived people of life, liberty, or property arbi-
trarily—that is, all legislation that was not designed to promote the public good by 
securing and enlarging people’s enjoyment of their natural rights.332 But such an 
understanding would seem to require inquiry into content or substance of legisla-
tion, and Lash has dismissed “substantive” due process in the past.333 
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Lash also does not reckon with Republican responses to President Johnson’s 
veto of the Civil Rights Act, which focused on the rights of citizens rather than 
those of all persons. Consider Representative William Lawrence’s speech—ex-
cerpted by Lash—calling upon Congress to overrule President Johnson’s veto of 
the Civil Rights Act:  
 
All the law-writers agree that every citizen has certain “absolute rights,” which 
include “The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right 
to acquire and enjoy property. These rights have been justly considered and fre-
quently declared by the people of this country to be natural, inherent, and inalien-
able.” . . .  
The bill of rights to the national Constitution declares that: “No person” . . . 
“shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” . . . 
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal 
security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are 
rights of citizenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are oth-
ers, as the right to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy prop-
erty, and to share the benefit of laws for the security of person and property.334 
 
Even as Lawrence drew upon the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law 
Clause, with its reference to “person[s]”, he emphasized the Act’s connection to 
citizenship. Thus, he affirmed the existence of a “national citizenship” which “im-
plie[d] certain rights which are to be protected” and stated that the Act merely de-
clared “what is already the constitutional rights of every citizen in every state.”335 
His most extensive discussion of the constitutional authority for the Civil Rights 
Act involved not the Due Process of Law Clause but the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause: 
 
I maintain that Congress may by law secure the citizens of the nation in the enjoy-
ment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and property, and the means essential 
to that end, by penal enactments to enforce the observance of the provisions of the 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, and the equal civil rights which it recognizes 
or by implication affirms to exist among citizens of the same State.  
Congress has the incidental power to enforce and protect the equal enjoyment 
in the States of civil rights which are inherent in national citizenship. The Consti-
tution declares these civil rights to be inherent in every citizen, and Congress has 
power to enforce the declaration. If it has not, then the Declaration of Rights are in 
vain, and we have a Government powerless to secure or protect rights which the 
Constitution declares every citizen shall have . . . 
The Constitution declares that— 
‘The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several states”336 . . . 
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Trumbull similarly responded to Johnson’s veto by focusing on the rights of 
citizens: 
 
[W]hat rights do citizens of the United States have? To be a citizen of the United 
States carries with it some rights; and what are they? They are those inherent, fun-
damental rights which belong to free citizens or free men in all countries, such as 
the rights of this bill, and they belong to them in all the States of the Union. The 
right of American citizenship means something.337 
 
Trumbull did not so much as mention due process of law.  
When Republicans did speak at length about due process of law in connection 
with the 1866 Act, their emphasis on what Lawrence called “natural, inherent, and 
inalienable rights” makes it difficult to believe that they understood due process of 
law to guarantee only fair legal proceedings. If a “substantive” understanding of 
due process of law was widely held and incorporated into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process of Law Clause, the Clause would not only have constitutional-
ized the Civil Rights Act but empowered the federal government to ensure that 
states did not henceforth arbitrarily deprive people of a variety of unenumerated 
rights that had once been left in the care of the states.  
This would be difficult to square with Lash’s account of what was politically 
possible in 1868. If Lash is right that Due Process of Law encompassed Lawrence’s 
“absolute rights,” that is, Lash seems less likely to be right about the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause being sellable to moderate Republicans only because it was un-
derstood to leave unenumerated rights to the states. Simply put, Lash cannot have 
a broad, unenumerated-rights-protective Due Process of Law Clause and a narrow, 
enumerated-rights-only Privileges or Immunities Clause and be right about Repub-
lican moderation. 
Lash’s claim that the Due Process of Law Clause alone provided constitutional 
authority for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its subsequent re-passage in the En-
forcement Act also faces considerable difficulties. As noted above, Section 18 spe-
cifically states that the 1866 Act is “hereby re-enacted.”338 Section 16, however, 
confers a bundle of rights that are similar but not identical to those conferred by the 
1866 Act. Compare the language of the 1866 Act to that of Section 16 of the En-
forcement Act:  
 
1866: [A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, 
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; 
and . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, 
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and 
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to 
the contrary notwithstanding.339 
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1870: [A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws 
and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white 
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, 
and exactions of every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.340  
 
The italicized language was redacted. Why? 
There is a compelling reason to believe that the redaction was a product of the 
change from “citizens” in 1866 to “all persons” in 1870.341 Lash acknowledges that 
“aliens” did not enjoy the same property rights as did “subjects” at common law,342 
thanks to a doctrine which tied certain rights to allegiance to the King.343 Among 
other things, the former could acquire and possess land but not hold “full” fee sim-
ple title.344  
Although the doctrine of allegiance was amended to fit the American context—
“subjects,” for instance, became “citizens,” and allegiance to the King became al-
legiance to the state345—the linkage between allegiance and landholding rights was 
maintained in the decades following the Revolution,346 endured throughout the an-
tebellum period,347 and persisted during the most open period of immigration in the 
nation’s history.348 As Polly Price has detailed, “exclusionary [landholding] prac-
tices . . . underlie[d] even . . . a period in which the opportunity to become an Amer-
ican citizen was available to all comers of the white race.”349  
Lash claims that “distinguishing the real property rights of citizens and noncit-
izens f[ell] comfortably within the Reconstruction-era understanding of the rights 
of due process.”350 Indeed, he states that this distinction “explains why the 1866 
Civil Rights Act demanded citizens be granted the equal right to ‘hold’ real prop-
erty, but the 1870 extension demanded only that all persons enjoy the general nat-
ural rights of ‘person and property.’”351  
Lash draws upon Ryan Williams’s scholarship, which shows that due process 
of law was originally understood to incorporate common law distinctions, and that 
the common law extended landholding rights to citizens that it did not extend to 
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non-citizens. Because of this, Lash argues, members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
could have understood the Due Process of Law Clauses to require the protection of 
citizens’ landholding rights but not to require the protection of non-citizens’ land-
holding rights.352 
If the 1870 redaction of the rights listed in the 1866 Act was indeed predicated 
upon the recognition that Congress was not obliged to guarantee to non-citizens 
equality with respect of all the rights listed in the 1866 Act but was obliged to 
guarantee equality with respect of some of them, Lash’s claim that the Due Process 
of Law Clause supplied authority for the 1866 Act would not necessarily be under-
mined by the Act’s inclusion of landholding rights. The Due Process of Law Clause 
could have been understood to constitutionalize the 1866 Act’s re-passage and the 
extension of a smaller set of rights to non-citizens in 1870. 
But, unless and until Lash articulates the theory of the due process of law that 
he believes a critical mass of Republicans held; shows that they did in fact hold it; 
and explains how it constitutionalized the 1866 Act, his claim that it did so will 
remain unproven. As it stands, we have an 1866 Act that refers only to the rights of 
citizens; that was forcefully defended in terms of the right of citizens; that protects 
landholding rights that had traditionally been denied to non-citizens; that was re-
passed without alteration as part of legislation that also extended a nearly identical 
bundle of rights to non-citizens—landholding rights conspicuously excepted. In 
contending that the 1866 Act was constitutionalized by a Due Process of Law 
Clause, the text of which draws no distinction between citizens and non-citizens—
as John Bingham repeatedly emphasized—Lash faces an uphill battle.353  
Why is it so important that Lash prove his Due Process of Law claim?  It is 
important because he cannot explain how an enumerated-rights-including-comity-
rights Privileges or Immunities Clause could supply the authority to prevent states 
from discriminating against their own citizens. If he is right about the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and wrong about the Due Process of Law Clause, it follows that 
leading Republicans were wrong to claim that the Fourteenth Amendment would 
constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. As the 1866 Act was widely sup-
ported by moderates and radicals and was believed to be central to the achievement 
of shared Republican goals, and Republicans frequently claimed that Section One 
would secure the 1866 Act’s constitutionality, the latter proposition is profoundly 
implausible.354 
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We are not demanding that Lash provide a comprehensive theory of the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and refuse to budge from it. In the future, 
however, it would be helpful if he explained in greater detail how and why he has 
updated his prior beliefs about the Fourteenth Amendment; and if he both 
acknowledge and explain any changes in his views concerning how the 1866 Act 
was constitutionalized.  
If in the end he concludes that the Due Process of Law Clause is limited to 
providing equal access to fair legal proceedings to all people, he should reconcile 
that conclusion with his 2017 beliefs about the Due Process of Law Clause consti-
tutionalizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which seems to guarantee more than fair 
legal proceedings and to secure rights that all people were not in 1868 understood 
to be constitutionally entitled to enjoy.  
If in the end he concludes that its coverage is broader, he should reconcile that 
conclusion with his 2014 pessimism about the prospects of an unenumerated-rights-
protective Privileges or Immunities Clause being ratified into law. It seems implau-
sible that moderate Republicans who, Lash insisted, had federalism-related con-
cerns about empowering the federal courts and Congress to secure citizens’ unenu-
merated rights would have signed off on a Due Process of Law Clause that empow-
ered the federal government to secure unenumerated natural rights belonging to all 
people.  
 




To sum up to this point: We lack confidence in the accuracy of Lash’s account 
of Bingham’s decision to replace “the privileges and immunities of citizens in the 
several states” with “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” 
and regard Lash’s ERO interpretation of Howard’s introduction of the third draft to 
the Senate to be unconvincing. Indeed, it seems to us that if Lash is right about the 
                                                 
shared Republican commitment to the abolition of the Black Codes, which did not—as we have 
seen—solely target legal process rights. Although the expected applications of constitutional text 
are not dispositive of original meaning, one should hesitate before attributing meaning to text that 
contradicts its framers’ and supporters’ public explanations of the text’s implications for highly 
salient legislation and which would thwart the accomplishment of their public-articulated goals. 
Further, Lash presents Bingham as an almost unerringly reliable source of interpretive information 
after his embrace of a comity-only view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. On his account, if 
anyone would have been in a position to identify constitutional problems with, and willing to object 
to, legislation that—however normatively desirable—exceeded Congress’s Section Five powers to 
enforce Section One, it would be Bingham. But, as Lash makes plain, Bingham enthusiastically 
supported the Enforcement Act, despite its protection of unenumerated rights and despite the dis-
tinctions it drew between citizens and non-citizens. Lash also adduces no evidence that Bingham 
objected to the 1866 Act because it protected unenumerated rights, and we have been unable to find 
any such evidence in the course of our own research. See Lash, supra note 23, at 1394 (arguing that 
Bingham “objected that Congress lacked power to enforce the rights of due process” and that he 
“also criticized Congress’s failure to extend these rights to all persons.”). 
 
Barnett & Bernick, Privileges or Immunities Abridged       ‖     Page 63 
 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, then Howard must have been either wrong or care-
less with his speech when he included unenumerated rights in his “mass” of “priv-
ileges, immunities, and rights” without making plain that he had only comity rights 
in mind. 
Given the weakness of Lash’s arguments that Bingham’s absolute-protection 
understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause was idiosyncratic and that 
his third draft was in fact a repudiation of it, we doubt that Howard was wrong. 
And, given that, as Christopher Green has observed, Howard “certainly explains 
himself more adequately than Bingham generally does,” we doubt that Howard was 
careless with his speech.355  
But Lash’s ERO theory is not yet doomed. “[C]ompetent speakers of the Eng-
lish language who were aware of the context in which the text was communicated 
for ratification” might have gleaned an ERO understanding from coverage of con-
gressional debates in the newspapers, arguments presented by the amendment’s 
supporters and opponents in the course of the ratification fight, and statements in 
response to politically salient events. This Section explores these materials. 
As we summarized in Part I, Lash’s case for a shared ERO understanding on 
the part of the public depends on “[n]ewspapers and political commentaries” that 
provided “a constant flow of information about the activities of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress”;356 Republican speeches and commentary in the late summer of 1866; 
urgent Republican calls for adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of 
state-sponsored murder of mostly Black citizens in New Orleans; President John-
son’s failed October counter-amendment; and continued Republican advocacy for 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the wake of the Republican landslide victory in the 
November elections. 
Early newspaper coverage of the congressional debates is not helpful to Lash. 
Lash makes much of two facts: First, that Bingham’s various affirmations that the 
emerging amendment was designed to enforce the “bill of rights” were widely-re-
ported. Second, that the “coverage of Jacob Howard’s presentation to the Senate of 
the final draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was wide and deep” and praised even 
by papers with a conservative bias as “clear and cogent.”357 We question whether 
it can be inferred from this coverage that readers understood the emerging amend-
ment to protect only enumerated rights.  
To begin with, recent scholarship has shown that the first eight or ten amend-
ments to the Constitution were not commonly referred to as “the Bill of Rights” 
until well into the Twentieth Century.358 Indeed, the scattered references to these 
amendment as “the bill of rights” by Republicans at this date is one of the very 
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earliest applications of this label to the amendments. As Gerard Magliocca has 
shown, this usage would not begin to gain steam until the debate over the acquisi-
tion of the Philippines in the late 1890s and the debate over Wilson administration 
abuses of civil liberties in the 1920s. It would not become standard public usage 
until Franklin Roosevelt employed the label in defense of the constitutionality of 
the New Deal.359 
Indeed, it was not until 1952 that “the Bill of Rights” was ensconced in the 
National Archives alongside the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion.360 Before 1938, the original published version of the amendments—which 
were not labeled “the Bill of Rights—that now resides there was hidden away in 
the basement of the State Department.361 Attributing the post-New Deal meaning 
of “the Bill of Rights” to the pre-Fourteenth Amendment public is anachronistic. 
(Although we have to admit it was an understandable mistake to have made before 
this recent revisionist scholarship.) 
Bingham’s own usage is evidence that “the Bill of Rights” lacked a standard 
meaning. We have seen that, at least early in the debates, Bingham used the “bill of 
rights” to encompass the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 
2, which he understood to protect unenumerated rights. Only years after ratifica-
tion—in a speech that is unusual in several respects—did he expressly exclude 
rights protected by Article IV from the “bill of rights.”362 
Among other things, the term “bill of rights” was most commonly associated 
with a prefatory statement of natural and fundamental rights such as found in the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, authored by George Mason, which was incorpo-
rated into Justice Washington’s summary of the privileges and immunities of Citi-
zens in the several states in Corfield. As Magliocca explains, the first ten amend-
ments were not thought to be a bill of rights because they did not resemble such 
perambulatory affirmations of rights.363 
With this in mind, it is unsurprising that, when Howard referred in his speech 
to “the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first amendments of the Con-
stitution,”364 he does not label these amendments “the Bill of Rights.” As we have 
already discussed, we do not agree that Howard’s speech is best read as expressing 
an ERO understanding. And Lash acknowledges that at least one newspaper under-
stood Howard to be referring only to rights protected by the Privileges and Immun-
ities Clause.365 It is wholly insufficient to say, as Lash does, that “the general idea 
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of the amendment seemed to be getting through,” implying an ERO understanding 
as the general idea, given the importance of the details.366  
Early Republican advocacy during the summer of 1866 also affirmatively un-
dermines Lash’s case for a public ERO understanding. Lash notes that “a number 
of Republicans expressly tied Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.”367 By drawing a connection between Section One and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Republicans made it more likely that members of the 
public would understand Section One to protect equality in the enjoyment of un-
enumerated rights to contract, property, and security—protection that, it bears re-
peating, Lash cannot account for in terms of the enforcement of an enumerated 
right to comity.  
As they did in the course of congressional debates, Republicans denied that 
Section One would enfranchise Blacks, but they neglected to rely upon the unenu-
merated status of the right to suffrage when doing so.368 Indeed, they could hardly 
do so while simultaneously maintaining that Section One removed doubts about the 
constitutionality of civil rights legislation that protected unenumerated rights. Lash 
further acknowledges that Republicans frequently emphasized “equal rights” with-
out “exploring the precise content of those ‘equal rights,’” even though it would 
have, on Lash’s account, have been easy for them to supply that content by com-
municating an ERO understanding, as well as politically useful in alleviating con-
cerns about suffrage.369 
Lash’s thorough examination of the activity of Southern Loyalists and Repub-
lican activists more generally in the wake of the slaughter in New Orleans yields 
persuasive evidence that the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and 
freedom of peaceable assembly and petition were understood by supporters of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to be among the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens. 
In particular, speeches made and resolutions adopted by the Southern Loyalists’ 
Convention, hosted in Philadelphia on September 3, 1866 expressed the view that 
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the enumerated rights that had been recently violated would be among the privi-
leges and immunities protected by the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.370  
This evidence offers compelling support for the proposition that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was understood to protect certain enumerated rights. But it is 
entirely consistent with the proposition that unenumerated rights that could not “be 
fully defined in their extent and precise nature” would also be protected by the 
Clause. That participants in the Convention emphasized that particular enumerated 
rights would be secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is understandable in the 
context of recent assaults upon those rights. We cannot infer from this that they 
understood the Amendment to secure only those rights, any more than we can infer 
from them that they understood the Amendment to include all and only enumerated 
rights, as Lash claims.  
This last point is crucially important. Lash adduces evidence from a variety of 
sources referring to particular enumerated rights. He codes some of those references 
as evidence of a “common conception of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment as 
guarding against state-sponsored abridgment of constitutionally enumerated 
rights.”371 But one could just as well code them as evidence of importantly different 
conceptions.  
For example, Lash presents Texas Judge Lorenzo Sherwood’s address to the 
Southern Loyalists Convention as evidence for the ERO theory: 
 
We stand on the Constitutional rights of the citizen; those rights specified and enu-
merated in the great charter of American liberty in the following form—Security 
to Life, Person and Property; Freedom of the Press; Freedom of Opinion; and Free-
dom in the exercise of Religion. Fair and impartial Trial by Jury under such regu-
lations as to make the administration of justice complete. Unobstructed commerce 
between the States, and the right of the citizens of each State to pass into and so-
journ in any other state, and to enjoy the immunities and privileges of the citizens 
of such other State. Exemption from any order of nobility or government through 
privileged class: The Guaranty of Republican Government in every State and, all 
the People thereof, making the preservation and maintenance of the above enumer-
ated rights, unless forfeited by crime, the constitutional test and definition of what 
is Republican government.372 
 
We have here a motley assortment of enumerated rights, and perhaps one un-
enumerated right—the Constitution does not enumerate a right to “[s]ecurity to life, 
person and property”, only a right not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law.” The references to enumerated rights are consistent with 
theories of the privileges and immunities of citizenship that include some but not 
all of the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments; theories that include both 
enumerated and unenumerated rights; and Lash’s distinctive ERO theory. This isn’t 
nothing, but it isn’t much help to Lash.  
The same can be said for the “Appeal of the Loyal Men of the South to their 
Fellow-Citizens of the United States” adopted midway through the convention: 
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Statute books groaned under despotic laws against unlawful and insurrec-
tionary assemblies aimed at the constitutional guaranties of the right to 
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances. It proscribed 
democratic literature as incendiary, nullified constitutional guaranties of 
free speech and a free press. It deprived citizens of the other States of the 
privileges and immunities in the States…373 
 
Lash describes the appeal as “specifically point[ing] to the states’ abridgment 
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the Un ited States, such as the rights 
of speech and press.”374 We agree that this is evidence that freedom of speech and 
of the press are among the privileges and immunities of citizenship. It is not, how-
ever, evidence of “common conception of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment as 
guarding against state-sponsored abridgment of constitutionally enumerated 
rights.”375 As with Lorenzo’s speech, it is consistent with a variety of theories of 
the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizenship which hold that at least some enu-
merated rights are protected—not evidence that lends support to the ERO theory in 
particular.  
These are not the only partial lists of enumerated rights that Lash collects, but 
they are representative. Such lists make it more likely that reasonably-informed 
members of the public generally would have understood at least some enumerated 
rights to be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But they do not make 
Lash’s distinctive theory that all enumerated rights and only enumerated rights were 
understood to be protected by the Clause more likely to be true.  
 Lash also makes too much of President Johnson’s counter-amendment. Lash 
describes it as a “a passive restatement of Article IV’s Comity Clause”;376 upholds 
it as evidence that Johnson found the language of Article IV unthreatening;377 and 
claims that Johnson would certainly not have endorsed language that he believed 
would be understood to protect substantive national rights.378 But Lash’s character-
ization of the counter-amendment is inaccurate.  
The counter-amendment does not merely “restate” the language of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause—it alters it in a way that implicitly repudiates the 
“ellipsis” theory propounded by Bingham by specifying that the protected privi-
leges and immunities belong to “citizens of the several states” rather than to “[citi-
zens of the United States] in the several states.”379 The effect is to tie the enjoyment 
of any privileges or immunities to state rather than to national citizenship.  
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Further, Lash acknowledges but fails to appreciate the significance of the fact 
that the amended language was “passive”—namely, that it did not confer upon Con-
gress the power to enforce it, any more than did Article IV.380 Taken together, these 
differences are sufficient to explain Johnson’s comfort with the counter-amend-
ment, irrespective of what he believed the content of “privileges and immunities” 
to be.  
Finally, post-election Republican advocacy—including advocacy highlighted 
by Lash—contradicts the ERO understanding. Consider the series of letters pub-
lished in The New York Times under the pseudonym “Madison.” Madison appar-
ently did not get the memo that Corfield listed rights that attached to state rather 
than to national citizenship, and that such rights would be protected only against 
parochial discrimination by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In the first letter, 
Madison wrote: 
 
What the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States are, are thus summed up in 
another case: Protection by the Government; enjoyment of life and liberty, with the rights 
to possess and acquire property of every kind, and to pursue happiness and safety; the right 
to pass through and reside in any other State, for the purposes of trade, agriculture, profes-
sional pursuits or otherwise; to obtain the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to take, hold 
and dispose of property, either real or personal, & c., & c. These are the long-defined rights 
of a citizen of the United States, with which the States cannot constitutionally interfere.381 
 
This is an unambiguous affirmation that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
will provide absolute protection to Corfield rights. It uses language from Corfield. 
It groups enumerated and unenumerated rights together. It describes all of those 
rights as “rights of a citizen of the United States.” It does not recognize the alleged 
distinction between unenumerated natural and common rights that were protected 
against parochial discrimination by Article IV and enumerated national rights that 
were to be protected, period, by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which Lash 
claims is the original public meaning of the term.  
Above all, “these” rights are not cast as comity rights. To read Madison as al-
lowing that States can “constitutionally interfere” with the “rights of a citizen of 
the United States,” so long as they do not discriminate against out-of-staters when 
doing so, is counterintuitive to say the least. 
In the second letter, Madison reiterates that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
“is intended for the enforcement of the Second Section of the Fourth Article of the 
Constitution” and proceeded to recite the language of the latter.382 Madison then 
referred readers to the first letter, stating that “[w]e have seen . . . what privileges 
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and immunities were intended.”383 After a discussion of the import of the Due Pro-
cess of Law and Equal Protection Clauses and some disparagement of the “feeble” 
opposition, Madison concluded by declaring that the Amendment will be “coexten-
sive with the whole Bill of Rights in its reason and spirit.”384  
Although Lash presents Madison’s claims that the Amendment is necessary to 
enforce “the Bill of Rights”—claims made in numerous letters—as evidence of an 
ERO understanding,385 it is obvious in context that the author understands “the Bill 
of Rights” to include a variety of unenumerated rights associated with Article IV. 
We have here another example of the nonstandard use of that phrase before it be-
came exclusively associated with the first eight or ten amendments.  
Lash’s treatment of Frederick Douglass’s January 1867 Atlantic essay is simi-
larly selective. Lash is certainly correct that Douglass “reminded readers of how 
the South had suppressed free speech, free press, and the free enterprise of reli-
gion.”386 But James Fox has pointed out that Douglass did much more, both in that 
essay and in a prior essay published in the Atlantic in December of 1866 in the 
immediate aftermath of the Republican victory.387 Douglass gave voice to an un-
derstanding of the privileges and immunities of citizenship that was not exhausted 
by enumerated rights.  
In portions of the January essay that Lash does not discuss, Douglass con-
demned the “denial of political rights” as an instantiation of master-slave ideology 
and describes suffrage as essential to citizenship.388 In the November essay, 
Douglass denied that the Constitution knew “any difference between a citizen of a 
State and a citizen of the United States”; affirmed that “[c]itizenship . . . includes 
all the rights of citizens, whether state or national”; and argued that the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause guaranteed that “a legal voter in any State shall be a legal 
voter in all the States.”389  
To focus only on Douglass’s references to enumerated rights is to narrow the 
breadth of his constitutional arguments and to fail to come to grips with the contes-
tation concerning the nature of citizenship that was taking place. This contestation 
makes the determinate public meaning for which Lash contends still less likely.390 
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The rest of the evidence adduced by Lash consists of statements made by gov-
ernors and representatives during the ratification process. Some of these identify 
particular enumerated rights as protected by the proposed amendment,391 and some 
affirm that all “constitutional rights” or “rights which the Constitution provides” 
are protected.392 Once again, statements that particular enumerated rights are 
among protected privileges and immunities cannot be taken to imply that only those 
rights, or only enumerated rights, are protected privileges and immunities, absent 
contextual enrichment that Lash does not provide. 
 General statements that all “constitutional rights” or “rights which the Consti-
tution provides” underdetermine the question of enumeration. We have just seen 
that Madison understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect those un-
enumerated rights “provide[d]” by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article 
IV, to which he or she referred as “the whole Bill of Rights.” To claim that these 
statements reflected an understanding of the “‘textualist nature’ of the ‘privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States’” is to raise the further question of 
whether those who made them understood the existing constitutional text as Lash 
does. Lash does not answer that question. 
Thus, we have a mass of evidence that certain enumerated rights—most prom-
inently the rights to freedom of speech, of the press, and of peaceable assembly—
were publicly understood to be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause; 
some evidence that unenumerated rights were publicly understood to be protected; 
and no evidence that all and only enumerated rights were understood to be pro-
tected.  
Lash is correct that none of the amendment’s supporters “described the Amend-
ment as nationalizing the subject of civil rights in the states, and many described 
the Amendment as requiring the states to protect rights listed in (what we now call) 
the Bill of Rights, especially speech and assembly.”393 But a number of the amend-
ment’s supporters did describe it as protecting unenumerated rights—whether by 
cementing the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or by authorizing 
Congress and the federal courts to prevent states from violating Corfield rights. And 
no supporters denied that it would do so, even though the ERO theory might have 
aided the amendment’s “painfully slow movement toward ratification.”394  
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5. Post-Ratification Evidence Does Not Support the ERO Understanding 
 
We are surprised in two respects by the post-ratification evidence curated by 
Lash. First, we are surprised that Lash interprets this evidence as being generally 
consistent with his ERO theory. Second, we are surprised that Lash neglects a 
wealth of other evidence from the same timeframe, which suggests that the ERO 
understanding did not take hold.   
We will begin by conceding that what Lash offers as the best piece of evidence 
in favor of his position does in fact offer some support for it. That evidence is John 
Bingham’s March 31, 1871, account of the constitutional thought behind the third 
draft of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, delivered in defense of the proposed 
Ku Klux Klan Act.  
Lash is correct about this: Bingham praised Barron as correctly decided and 
needing to be reversed by a properly worded amendment; stated that the “privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States” are “chiefly defined in the first 
eight amendments,” which he went on to quote in their entirety; and most signifi-
cantly described the rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause as 
“other and different” than the “civil rights” which Corfield held that states “could 
not refuse to extend to citizens of other states.”395  
Standing alone, Bingham seems here to deny that the “privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States” effectively nationalized Corfield rights. It is indeed 
difficult to read this account as anything other than a denial that the set of rights 
protected by Article IV is identical to the set of rights protected by the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause. 
On the other hand, it is equally difficult to read this particular speech and find 
any support for Lash’s current view that the Privileges or Immunities of U.S. citi-
zens extends to enumerated rights beyond those in the first eight amendments.396 
Bingham here speaks only of the first eight amendments. There is, therefore, noth-
ing in this speech that supports Lash’s current claim that Bingham (or anyone else) 
viewed the comity-only reading of Article IV as an additional enumerated right.  
Perhaps, however, we should not overread this speech—the only speech pre-
sented by Lash in which one of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly 
denies that Corfield rights are among the privileges and immunities of national cit-
izenship.397 To say, as Bingham does, that privileges or immunities are “chiefly 
defined” in the first eight amendments is to imply that they are not entirely defined 
in the first eight amendments. Indeed, a few moments later, as Christopher Green 
points out,398 Bingham himself offered the following caveat about his preceding 
remarks: “in this discussion I have . . . referred only incidentally to the provisions 
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of the Constitution guarantying rights, privileges, and immunities to the citizens of 
the United States.”399  
Bingham then asked “the House, when they come to deliberate upon this ques-
tion, not to forget the imperishable words of our great Declaration [of Independ-
ence], ‘All men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with the rights of 
life and liberty.”400 He also asked “gentlemen not to forget those other words of the 
Declaration, that ‘to protect [sic] these rights’ (not to confer them) ‘governments 
are instituted among men.’”401  
Then, just after this clear affirmation of natural rights, Bingham sings the 
praises of the unenumerated “liberty . . . to work in an honest calling and contribute 
by your toil in some sort to the support of yourself, to the support of your fellow 
men, and to be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of your toil.”402  And, lest we 
jump to the conclusion that he was here referring to some comity-only-protected 
natural rights—or rights protected only by the due process of law, Bingham equated 
these unenumerated liberties with “the right ‘to know, to argue, and to utter freely 
according to conscience’”403—natural rights that are protected by the First Amend-
ment. 
At best, if Bingham’s 1871 speech is not contradictory, then it is ambiguous. 
But that’s not all. Bingham’s Woodhull Report on women’s suffrage—issued just 
two months previous—plainly affirms that the set of rights protected by Article IV 
is identical to the set of rights protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. 
Lash’s dismissal of the Woodhull Report is unsatisfactory.404  
Suppose we grant that Bingham’s subsequent speech is a more credible expres-
sion of his own personal understanding of the Clause than his Woodhull Report, 
irrespective of whether anyone else shared it. It remains striking that neither the 
majority of Committee members who signed onto the Woodhull Report, nor the 
minority who opposed it, endorsed the ERO theory, even though they disagreed 
about which rights the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected. Six of these ten 
Committee members were members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress;405 three were 
elected to office in November of 1866.406 In short, the Woodhull Report makes 
Lash’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause less likely.  
Unsatisfactory, too, is Lash’s failure in his book to discuss Howard’s post-rati-
fication commentary on the Clause, given Lash’s (justified, in our view) reliance 
upon Howard as a credible source of interpretive information. On February 8, 1869, 
Howard rebutted Republican arguments—advanced by Senators Charles Sumner 
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and George Edmunds—that the Privileges or Immunities Clause secured voting 
rights as follows: 
 
The occasion of introducing the first section of the fourteenth article of amendment 
into that amendment grew out of the fact that there was nothing in the whole Con-
stitution to secure absolutely the citizens of the United States in the various States 
against an infringement of their rights and privileges under the second section of 
the fourth article of the old Constitution. That section declares that—“The citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several States.” 
There it was plainly written down. Now, sir, it seems to me, that unless the 
Senator from Vermont and the Senator from Massachusetts can derive the right of 
voting from this ancient second section of the fourth article upon the ground that 
the citizens of each State are entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens 
of the several States, they must give up the argument; and I assert here with confi-
dence that no such construction was ever given to the second section of the fourth 
article of the Constitution.407 
 
Had Howard held an ERO understanding, it would have been easy for him to 
simply state that the right of voting was unenumerated and thus unprotected against 
invidious discrimination. Given that he did not do so, we think he is best read as 
arguing that the fourteenth amendment was designed to “secure absolutely” the 
“rights and privileges” protected merely against parochial discrimination by Article 
IV against all invidious state discrimination. Accordingly, the right of voting is not 
thus secured because it is not among those “rights and privileges.”  
It is also clear that Howard did not agree with Bingham’s sharp distinction be-
tween the rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause and those pro-
tected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. So, even if we grant that Lash has 
read Bingham’s 1871 speech correctly, there appears to be a post-ratification con-
flict between Bingham and Howard that Lash simply does not address.408 
                                                 
407 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1003 (1869) (emphases added).  
408
 In a blog post, Lash interpreted Howard to be arguing that “[i]f the Comity Clause did not pro-
vide that right to anyone (visitor or resident), then neither did the Fourteenth Amendment.” Kurt 
Lash, More Than Equality, Less Than Federalizing the Common Law: A Response to Christopher 
Green, THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www .originalismblog.typepad.com/the-
originalism-blog/2014/11/more-than-equality-less-than-federalizing-the-common-law-a-response-
to-christopher-green-kurt-lash.html [http://perma .cc/T22C-5VB3]. It is not clear why Howard 
would have deployed such an argument against Sumner and Edmunds, who were not arguing that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected the right to vote against merely parochial discrimina-
tion but, rather, against all invidious state discrimination. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 
1003 (1869) (Senator Sumner) (arguing that a constitutional amendment “conceded to the States the 
power to discriminate against colored persons” when regulating the qualifications of voters “would 
not have passed the Senate had anyone attributed to it that meaning”); id. at 1002 (Senator Edmunds) 
(arguing that “it is one of the essential privileges of citizenship . . . to vote, to exercise political 
power” and implying that any state constitutional clause that “limits the right to vote to persons of 
a particular race” is “swept away” by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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Turning now to post-ratification case law, Lash begins his study with two deci-
sions: Garnes v. McCann and The Live-Stock Dealers. In Garnes, the Ohio Su-
preme Court rejected a claim that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade segregated 
schools.409 Lash reads Judge Luther Day’s opinion for the court in Garnes as “re-
ject[ing] an effort to interpret the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause as protecting 
unenumerated rights.”410 Lash excerpts the following language: 
 
We are not aware that this has been as yet judicially settled. The language of the 
clause, however, taken in connection with other provisions of the amendment, and 
the constitution of which it forms a part, affords strong reasons for believing that 
it includes only such privileges or immunities as are derived from, or recognized 
by, the constitution of the United States. A broader interpretation opens a field of 
conjecture limitless as the range of speculative theories, and might work such lim-
itations of the power of the States to manage and regulate their local institutions 
and affairs as were never contemplated by the amendment.411 
 
This language does not help Lash. First, Judge Day is more tentative than one 
would expect, if indeed the ERO theory of “privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States” was widely held. He offers only “strong reasons” for his inter-
pretation of the language, as if it were not obvious that the claimed right was un-
protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Second, for reasons that we have 
repeated, general statements to the effect that the privileges and immunities of U.S. 
citizens must be “derived from” the Constitution are ambiguous as to whether those 
rights must be enumerated in the sense claimed by Lash. At best, Garnes does not 
contradict Lash’s account. It does not make that account more likely to be true.  
In contrast, Justice Bradley’s opinion in The Live-Stock Dealers clearly contra-
dicts Lash’s account. Lash emphasizes Bradley’s claim that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause “embraces much more” than the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
of Article IV, and the latter only prohibited states from “discriminating in favor of 
[their] own citizens, and against the citizens of other states.”412 But in the very next 
paragraph after the language excerpted by Lash, Justice Bradley equates the rights 
protected by the two clauses and implies that they may not all be enumerated: 
  
What, then, are the essential privileges which belong to a citizen of the United 
States, as such, and which a state cannot by its laws invade? It may be difficult to 
enumerate or define them. The supreme court, on one occasion, thought it unwise 
to do so. 18 How. 591.413  
 
                                                 
409
 Garnes, 21 Ohio at 211.  
410
 LASH, supra note 14, at 232. 
411 Garnes, 21 Ohio at 209-10. 
412
 The Live Stock Dealers, 15 F. Cas., at 652.  
413 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The citation is to Conner v. Elliot,414 in which the Court discussed, but provided no 
definitive interpretation of, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.415  
Worse still for Lash, Bradley goes on to identify the unenumerated “privilege  . 
. . of every American citizen to adopt and follow . . . lawful industrial pursuit[s]” 
alongside the enumerated rights to due process of law and equal protection of the 
laws as privileges without indicating that enumeration has any significance.416 It is 
the fact that these privileges “cannot be invaded without sapping the very founda-
tions of republican government” that, for Justice Bradley, identifies them as “es-
sential” and therefore protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.417 
We have examined every decision prior to the Slaughter-House Cases in which 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was discussed.418 We have found no case in 
which a court expressly distinguished the set of rights protected by the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause from those protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause. We have found no case in which a court expressly endorsed Lash’s ERO 
theory. We have found no case in which a court expressly rejects the proposition 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects unenumerated rights.  
To the contrary, we have found numerous cases in which courts endorsed the 
latter proposition, including not only the The Live Stock Dealers but also: 
 
• Burns v. State: the “rights conferred by citizenship” include the right of “suing 
any other citizen” and “the right to make and enforce contracts, amongst which 
is that of marriage with any citizen capable of entering into that relation.”;419  
• United States v. Hall: in which future Supreme Court Justice William Woods 
identified privileges or immunities as “those which may be denominated funda-
mental,” citing Corfield;420 and  
• In Re Hobbs: stating that “[a]ny attempt . . . to enumerate or describe the fun-
damental rights” secured by the Privileges or Immunities Clause would “give 
but an unsatisfactory result.”421  
• Van Valkenburg v. Brown: privileges and immunities include “the enjoyment of 
life and liberty, and the right to acquire and possess property, and to demand 
and receive the protection of the Government in aid of these,” as well as “the 
                                                 
414
 18 How. 591 (1856). 
415
 Id. at 593.  
416
 The Live-Stock Dealers, 15 F. Cas., at 652. 
417
 Id.  
418
 These cases include White v. Clements, 39 Ga. 232 (1869); Ex parte Smith, 38 Cal. 702 (1869); 
The Live-Stock Dealers, 15 F. Cas.; Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287 (1871); United States v. Hall, 26 
F. Cas. 79 (S.D. Ala. 1871); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871); State v. Stanton's Liquors, 38 
Conn. 233 (1871); In Re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262 (1871); Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43 
(1872); Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872); Minor v. Happersett, 53 Mo. 58 (1873); Donnell v. State, 
48 Miss. 661 (1873). 
419
 Burns, 48 Ala., at 198.  
420
 Hall, 26 F. Cas., at 81. Woods included “among” these rights “those which in the constitution 
are expressly secured to the people, either as against the action of the federal or state governments,” 
such as “the right of freedom of speech, and the right peaceably to assemble.” Id. 
421
 See In Re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas., at 264.  
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right to sue and defend in the Courts, to have the benefit of the writ of habeas 
corpus, and an exemption from higher taxes or heavier impositions than were to 
be borne by other persons under like conditions and circumstances.”422 
 
Given the massiveness of his research, Lash’s failure to discuss the myriad author-
ities that rejected his position in the pre-Slaughter-House case law is hard to under-
stand.  
This brings us to Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court in The Slaughter-House 
Cases, which Lash presents as a badly-misunderstood affirmation of an ERO un-
derstanding. Lash is not alone in this revisionist view of Miller’s opinion. Now-
Judge Kevin Newsom defended a similar view.423 So has Bryan Wildenthal.424 
We do not find the revisionist view persuasive. James Fox has pointed out that 
most of the specific rights that Justice Miller mentions in his opinion for the Court 
are based on citizens’ interactions with the federal government.425 The references 
to petition, assembly, and habeas are sandwiched between the right to protection 
by the federal government when traveling on the high seas or within the protection 
of a foreign government, the right to use the navigable waters of the United States, 
and the right to enjoy rights that have been recognized in treaties.426 Only then does 
Justice Miller acknowledge that there “may be” rights protected by the Clause that 
are clearly good against the states—such as those specified in the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.427  
The contrast between this language and Justice Bradley’s unequivocal affirma-
tions in dissent that a wide range of enumerated rights are protected by the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause against state interference428 is stark. Justice Miller’s 
omission to acknowledge this point of partial agreement with Bradley cries out for 
an explanation that Lash does not provide.429 We thus find it unsurprising that the 
Court in Cruikshank did not see any inconsistency between the reasoning of 
Slaughter-House and its own conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
protected only the right to petition Congress.430 
Turning, finally, to Lash’s post-ratification commentary on the Clause, we 
again find that Lash overstates his case for consistency. It is true, as Lash claims, 
                                                 
422 Van Valkenburg, 43 Cal. at 48-50. 
423
 Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting lncorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643 (2000). 
424
 Bryan H. Wildenthal, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Slaughter-House Cases: 
An Essay in Constitutional-Historical Revisionism, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 241 (2001). 
425
 See Fox, supra note 259, at 78-9. 
426
 Id. at 78; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., at 80.  
427
 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., at 80.  
428
 Id. at 118-9 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (listing rights “specified in the original Constitution, or in 
the early amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities” of U.S. citizenship).  
429
 Fox, supra note 259, at 80.  
430
 Cruikshank, 92 U.S., at 552. 
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that John Norton Pomeroy, Timothy Farrar, and George Paschal all interpreted Sec-
tion One as overturning Barron.431 But these commentators also said things that are 
either in tension with, or outright contradict, Lash’s ERO theory.  
Farrar identified the set of rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause with the set protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and included 
among privileges and immunities those federally unenumerated rights specified in 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Farrar affirmed that Article IV “‘privileges and im-
munities,’ whether originally natural, personal, or common-law rights, or civil and 
political rights” are now “legal rights secured by the Constitution to every citizen 
of the United States,” citing “Am. 14, § 1.”432 Pomeroy opined that the “broad, 
general principles of interpretation” adopted by the Slaughter-House dissenters was 
“correct” and predicted (incorrectly) that it would “in time, be universally ac-
cepted.”433  
Paschal’s view appears closest to Lash’s ERO theory. He took a comity-only 
view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause; stated that Section One “impose[s] 
upon the States” those “general principles which had been construed to apply only 
to the national government”; and stated that those principles are embodied in the 
“guarant[ees]” of both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and “the thirteen 
amendments.”434 Yet, this is awfully nonspecific language, and Paschal’s subse-
quent praise for Justice Stephen Field’s “very able” dissent in The Slaughter-House 
Cases raises questions about how broad Paschal understood those “general princi-
ples” to be.435 
Finally, we are surprised that Lash does not discuss the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
at any length.436 To be sure, the further one gets from ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the less probative interpretation of constitutional provisions is of orig-
inal understanding. Memories fade; political possibilities change; the expected 
costs to legislators of misrepresenting the meaning of constitutional clauses de-
clines with the likelihood of detection; and departure from original meaning be-
comes less likely to be detected as time passes.  
                                                 
431
 LASH, supra note 14, at 273.  
432
 See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (3d ed. 
1872). See also id. at 200 (stating that “on the 9th of April, 1866, a statute was enacted for executing 
[the Privileges and Immunities Clause]”).  
433
 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 179 (1886).  
434
 GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY 
ANNOTATED 290 (1868).  
435
 Id. at 488. 
436 18 Stat 335. Section 1 of the Act provided that “all persons . . . shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public con-
veyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the con-
ditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, 
regardless of any previous condition of servitude.” Id. at 336.  Section 4 forbade racial discrimina-
tion in jury service. Id. at 336-7. Section 1 was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883); Section 4 was upheld in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 
(1880).  
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But, the four-year evolution of the Act from an initial proposed amendment to 
legislation that allowed former Confederates to serve in office into a standalone bill 
spans the post-ratification period canvassed by Lash. His failure to consider what 
legislators had to say about privileges, immunities, and citizenship in connection 
with it during that time frame seems to demand an explanation which Lash does 
not provide.  
We think that it is probative of the original meaning of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause that Republicans overwhelmingly relied upon an interpretation of 
it that included unenumerated rights;437 that they did so when arguing for and 
against the constitutionality of provisions of the evolving Act that guaranteed non-
discrimination in common carriers, places of public accommodation, public school-
ing, and jury selection;438 and that only Democrats who opposed the Act relied upon 
something resembling Lash’s ERO theory of the Clause.439  
It is of course possible that the Act’s supporters were wrong on the constitu-
tional merits—although we do not think that they were.440 It is also true that not all 
Republicans supported the Act—notable exceptions include Senators Lyman 
Trumbull, Matthew Carpenter, Orris Ferry, and Lot Morrill.441 But even those Re-
publicans who had constitutional misgivings about various incarnations of the Act 
did not make arguments from enumeration.  
That the Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed the enjoyment of unenu-
merated civil rights associated with citizenship was common ground for Republi-
cans.442 Differences concerned whether particular rights that were to be secured by 
                                                 
437 At least, until the Slaughter-House Cases came down, at which point some of them shifted to 
the Equal Protection Clause. See CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 98 (2015) 
(discussing this move).  
438
 The public schooling provisions were included in Senator Charles Sumner’s initial proposal. See 
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (1870) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (explaining that the 
proposal would “secure equal rights in railroads, steamboats, public conveyances, hotels, licensed 
theaters, houses of public entertainment, common schools, and institutions of learning authorized 
by law, church institutions, and cemetery associations incorporated by national or State authority; 
also on juries in courts, national and State.”). 
439 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 25-26 (1872) (Sen. Thurman); id. at 342–43 
(1873) (Sen. Beck); id. at app. 233–44 (1874) (Rep. Norwood). 
440 We will elaborate our position in a subsequent Article.  
441 Carpenter objected to a provision that forbade racial discrimination in jury selection; Ferry, 
Morrill and Trumbull objected to the entire Act. An earlier version of the Act forbade discrimination 
in public schools—Ferry, Morrill, and Trumbull objected to this provision for different reasons than 
they objected to the common-carrier and public accommodation provisions. See Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1029-43 (1995). In 
brief, the latter three Republicans either conceded that rights of nondiscriminatory access to com-
mon carriers and public accommodations were civil rights but denied that federal intervention was 
necessary to protect them or questioned whether inns, theaters, and places of public amusement—
all specified in the Act—were really places of public accommodation. By contrast, they denied that 
nondiscriminatory access to public schools was a civil right at all.  
442 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3191 (1872) (Sen. Trumbull) (“civil rights” be-
longing to citizens include “right to come and go; the right to enforce contracts; the right to convey 
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the Act were in fact “civil rights” that Congress had the constitutional authority to 
protect, as well as whether it was necessary for Congress to protect them.443  
If Lash’s ERO theory were correct, it would seem that all of these Republicans 
were confused about the basic nature of the Privileges or Immunities Clause—
which seems extraordinarily unlikely. It should give him pause that the only advo-
cates of an ERO theory were members of the party that opposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s ratification in the first place and who had compelling political incen-
tives to abridge its scope as much as possible to thwart civil rights legislation. With 
friends like these, Lash’s ERO theory becomes still less plausible as an interpreta-
tion of the Amendment’s original meaning. 
We do not offer here a theory of the discount rate that should be used in as-
sessing the credibility of post-ratification evidence.444 It is clear, however, that ev-
idence generated during the post-ratification period does not make Lash’s interpre-
tation of the Clause more likely to be true. There is little evidence that the ratified 
language was understood by most Republicans or by courts and commentators dur-
ing this timeframe to protect only enumerated rights, and much evidence that sug-
gests otherwise.  
The only unambiguous advocacy of an ERO theory during this timeframe ap-
pears to have come from Democratic opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 
upon whom Lash is understandably loath to rely for credible interpretations of an 
amendment that they opposed, or for credible claims concerning the authority it 
provided for legislation they also opposed. This is not good company for Lash to 
keep, and he wisely declines to do so. 
 
6. Lash’s Pessimism About the Enactment of an Unenumerated-Rights-Protective 
Amendment is Unwarranted 
 
Lash is relentlessly bearish about the prospects of any amendment that was un-
derstood to protect unenumerated rights being proposed and ratified during the 
                                                 
his property; the right to buy property” and other “common law right[s], regarded as a right apper-
taining to the individual as a citizen”); id. at 3192 (Sen. Sherman) (privileges of citizenship include 
those that “belong to American citizens, under the common law, which prevails all over this country, 
inherited from England” including common-carrier access and the “immunities of citizens . . . de-
fined” in the 1866 Civil Rights Act); id. at 762 (Sen. Carpenter) (including “the privilege of prac-
ticing law, if a man can meet the test and pass the necessary examination in the courts; the right of 
preaching the gospel, if employed and settled according to the usages of any particular church; the 
right of giving instruction in the public schools” among the “privileges of an American citizen” 
protected “under the fourteenth amendment”); id. at app. 4 (Sen. Morrill) (privileges and immunities 
are “those common privileges which one community accords to another in civilized life.”).  
443 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 827-28 (1872) (Sen. Carpenter) (describing right 
to sit on jury as a federally unprotectable “political right”); id. at 3190 (Sen. Trumbull) (denying 
that the right to go to school is a federally protectable “civil right”); id. at 3257 (Sen. Ferry) (ac-
knowledging that Black citizens have a “right” not to be excluded from inns, theaters, or common 
carriers but denying that segregated public schools present constitutional concerns); id. at app. 4 
(1872) (Sen. Morrill) (privileges and immunities include those specified in the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 and rights of access to common carriers but not rights of access to theaters and inns).  
444 We will stipulate that it ought not be zero.   
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Thirty-Ninth Congress. Again445 and again,446 he denies that moderates and con-
servatives would have signed off on a Privileges or Immunities Clause that would 
“nationalize natural and common law civil rights in the states.”447 Lash repeatedly 
insists that radicals who might have hoped for the latter simply did not have the 
votes.  
We agree that the Thirty-Ninth Congress would not likely have proposed an 
amendment that was widely understood to leave the specification of “privileges or 
immunities” entirely to Congress, owing to widespread Republican attachment to 
some version of federalism, fear of a future Democratic Congress, and deep, wide-
spread racism within both northern and southern society.448 But Lash offers no com-
pelling reason to believe that a proposed amendment which was understood to pro-
tect some unenumerated rights that had been long and widely deemed fundamental 
to U.S. citizenship would have met the same fate.  
This was not, after all, a Congress that was unprepared to enact legislation that 
expressly such unenumerated rights. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 expressly pro-
tected unenumerated rights, and Lash acknowledges that numerous Republicans 
affirmed during the ratification process that Section One would secure the Civil 
Rights Act’s constitutionality.  
We agree with Lash that evolution of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from an 
initial proposal which generally forbade “discrimination in civil rights or immuni-
ties”449 to a final text which specified only particular citizenship rights was in part 
the product of Republican concerns about the preservation of federalism.450 But its 
final text discloses a Republican consensus concerning the need to protect certain 
fundamental rights associated with citizenship, whether or not constitutionally enu-
merated. 
Lash might respond that the fact that Congress was prepared to enact legislation 
that protected unenumerated rights against discrimination might not have been pre-
pared to constitutionalize absolute protection for those rights. Such a response, 
however, would be unpersuasive. Although the 1866 Act has accurately been de-
scribed as anti-discrimination legislation, it effectively secured absolute protection 
for fundamental rights belonging to all citizens by using the rights enjoyed by white 
citizens as a standard. The Act’s language—“as is enjoyed by white citizens”—
                                                 
445
 LASH, supra note 14, at 104 (Bingham’s initial draft had “nothing to do with radical efforts to 
nationalize the countless common law and natural rights traditionally regulated by the states). 
446
 Id. at 285 (“[M]oderates opposed on federalist grounds any effort to nationalize the substance of 
civil rights in the states.”).  
447
 Id. at 78.  
448
 See Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebel-
lum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 419 (1986) (acknowledging “extreme racism” in the North but 
emphasizing that while “economic and social conditions for northern blacks were generally deplor-
able,” there was “a clear trend in the direction of granting greater legal rights and protections to free 
blacks.”). 
449 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 211 (1866). 
450 Lash, supra note 23, at 1430.  
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contemplates that whites were generally enjoying the specified rights and presum-
ably would continue to do so.451 If the Act does not expressly forbid states from 
denying those rights to all citizens—whites and blacks alike—that particular pos-
sibility was deemed remote.452 
So, as a practical matter, the distinction between protection against discrimina-
tion and absolute protection made no difference. If there was any reason to think 
that those who believed that the Act was constitutional also believed that there was 
a constitutionally salient distinction between forbidding discrimination with respect 
to the listed rights, on the one hand, and absolutely protecting them, on the other, 
Lash does not offer it.  
More generally, Lash’s argument appears to rest upon unwarranted confidence 
in his capacity to specify the range of possible outcomes of a highly complex col-
lective decisionmaking process. According to Lash, if an amendment that gave 
Congress and the federal courts a blank check to define and protect unenumerated 
rights would have been rejected, then any amendment that succeeded must have 
been understood to exclude unenumerated rights.  
Lash’s conclusion does not follow from his premise. Suppose, counterfactually, 
that Bingham emerged from his deliberations with a version of Section One con-
taining the language in italics:  
  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge any rights of citizens of the 
United States that are expressly enumerated in the text of the Constitution of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.453  
 
We think it plausible that this hypothetical Section One—a more-specific artic-
ulation of what Lash understands the enacted Section One to mean—would have 
met with considerable resistance. Democrats, of course, would have opposed it, as 
they would have opposed any proposed amendment. We suspect that not only rad-
icals, but even moderate Republicans would have opposed it because it would not 
clearly secure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Obviously, an 
enumerated-rights-only Privileges or Immunities Clause would not have secured 
the Act’s constitutionality, and Lash has not developed a persuasive theory of how 
the original meaning of the Due Process of Law, Equal Protection, or Citizenship 
                                                 
451 The phrase “as is enjoyed by white citizens” was added by James Wilson, who explained that 
“it was thought by some persons that unless those qualified words were incorporated in the bill, 
those rights might be extended to all citizens, whether male or female, major or minor.” CONG. 
GLOBE., 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1866) (Rep. Wilson).  The explanation suggests that he did not 
understand the change to transform the Act in any significant way; the lack of comment suggests 
that no one else did.  
452 See MALTZ, supra note, at 67 (describing it as “so farfetched that no speaker even considered 
it.”). 
453 U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.  
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Clauses would have done so. Of course, given that this is a counterfactual, it is 
difficult to say.  
If the above hypothetical amendment would have been defeated, then does it 
follow that the enacted amendment must have afforded absolute protection to un-
enumerated rights, or safeguarded citizens against other-than-parochial discrimina-
tion? It does not. The enacted amendment may have been underdeterminate as to 
some or all of those questions, in the sense that there may be no one answer to them 
in which the ratifiers would have placed a higher credence than any other.454 Un-
derdeterminacy, in turn, may have resulted from a failure on the part of the framers 
to reach agreement concerning them, and the failure of subsequent public debate to 
produce such agreement. 
In a subsequent article, we will argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
did clearly authorize Congress and the federal courts to protect unenumerated civil 
rights that shared a family resemblance. At the same time, it did not confer upon 
Congress plenary power to regulate the full panoply of these rights. For his argu-
ment-from-implausibility to work, Lash needs to show that an amendment that 
threaded this needle would likely have not made it through the relevant veto-gates. 
This he does not do. 
Instead he relies—as did Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases—upon 
tendentious characterizations of unenumerated-rights-protective theories of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as effectively turning Congress into a “perpetual 
censor” upon all state legislation and expressing doubt that such a Clause could 
have been ratified. We share his doubts on that score. But we have similar doubts 
about a differently-worded amendment that specified his ERO understanding.  
We also doubt that—assuming his account of the political dynamics is accu-
rate—a Due Process of Law Clause that empowered the federal courts and Con-
gress to secure people’s natural rights through such means as the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 would be seen as any less threatening to “moderate” Republicans than a 
Privileges or Immunities Clause that absolutely protected the kinds of rights listed 
by Justice Washington in Corfield.  
Given these doubts, Lash’s argument-from-implausibility fails.  
  
      CONCLUSION  
 
We would not blame readers for being disappointed in our conclusion that the 
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is considerably more com-
plicated than Kurt Lash makes it out to be. The pull of parsimony is strong. And 
Lash’s account of the Clause’s meaning—enumerated rights and nothing but455—
                                                 
454
 Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 462, 473 (1987) (distinguishing determinacy, indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy). In brief, 
the constitutional text is underdeterminate with respect to a given question “if only if the set of 
results . . . that can be squared with the legal materials is a nonidentical subset of the set of all 
imaginable results.” Id.  
455 See Green, supra note 12 (reviewing Lash’s book). Lash objects to the “incorporationist” label, 
and so we do not apply it. See Lash, supra note 351 (objecting that the term suggests that Lash holds 
Justice Hugo Black’s view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause “protects nothing more than the 
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seems to promise originalists who are concerned about the abuse of judicial discre-
tion that they can have their original meaning and eat their judicial restraint, too.  
Alas, this promise is false. Despite its appeal, it should not be adopted, either 
by scholars and citizens who seek a comprehensive understanding of the Clause’s 
original meaning, or by public officials who are oath-bound to interpret and imple-
ment the Clause.  
We are aware that it takes a theory to beat a theory, and that we have only begun 
to sketch one of our own.456 We urge those who are skeptical of unenumerated 
rights to bear with us. As Justice Clarence Thomas put it when calling for the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause’s revival in his landmark concurrence in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago457:  
 
The mere fact that the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause does not expressly list the 
rights it protects does not render it incapable of principled judicial application. The 
Constitution contains many provisions that require an examination of more than 
just constitutional text to determine whether a particular act is within Congress' 
power or is otherwise prohibited . . . To be sure, interpreting the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause may produce hard questions. But they will have the advantage of 
being questions the Constitution asks us to answer.458 
 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause raised hard questions that led even those 
present at its enactment to speak of its “euphony and indefiniteness of meaning”459 
and to express uncertainty about its “effect.”460 Kurt Lash’s diligent research and 
                                                 
rights of the first eight amendments”). We, too, reject “incorporation” as an unhelpful way of con-
ceiving of the panoply of fundamental rights protected from abridgment by the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause. 
456
 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (1970) (observing that “once 
it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative 
candidate is available to take its place.”). Kuhn’s central point is that “anomalies abound in all the-
ories, but we are prepared to live with them if we find the theory to be more useful than the best 
alternative.” Ray Ball, The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What Have 
We Learned?, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FINANCE, 1,13 (2009).  
457
 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
458 McDonald, 561 U.S., at 854-5 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
459
 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, 2 REMINSCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS 41–42 (1902) 
(writing that the Clauses’s “euphony and indefiniteness of meaning was a charm to [Bingham].”);  
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (Sen. Howard) (stating that the privileges and immunities 
of citizenship “are not and cannot be fully defined in their extent and precise nature”). For evidence 
post-ratification uncertainty, see, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1871) (Sen. Pool) 
(acknowledging that the “[t]he full scope of the rights incident to citizenship may not be easy to 
define” and looking to English common law for guidance); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 
(1872) (Sen. Sherman) (observing that “[t]here may be sometimes great dispute and doubt as to 
what is the right, immunity, or privilege conferred upon a citizen of the United States”); Cong. Rec. 
1870 (1875) (Sen. Edmunds) (admitting that “it may be that you cannot make a precise definition” 
of the privileges or immunities of citizenship but affirming that “what belongs to a man in his char-
acter as a citizen has been long in a great many respects well understood.”) 
460
 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866) (Sen. Johnson) (objecting to and moving 
to redact the Privileges or Immunities Clause because of his uncertainty about its “effect.” The lone 
 
Barnett & Bernick, Privileges or Immunities Abridged       ‖     Page 84 
 
serious engagement with these questions has borne tremendous fruit that we have 
been able to gather at a considerably lower cost than we might have otherwise in-
curred, thanks to his assiduous efforts, for which we sincerely commend him. We 
have learned much even from what we have concluded are his mistakes. We will 
bring to bear more of what we have learned when, in our next article, we present 
an interpretation that better fits the available evidence. 
But, in the end, we must side with Jacob Howard. 
                                                 
Democrat on the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Senator Reverdy Johnson was “[a] noted con-
stitutional authority” who “remained a respected figure in the Senate.” Eartl M. Maltz, The Four-
teenth Amendment as Political Compromise—Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruc-
tion, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933, 957 (1984)). 
